Authoritarian leaders deliberately foster competition and division among their security services. This prevents any single group from becoming powerful enough to stage a coup, but it also creates deep-seated animosities and disaffection that external actors can exploit to destabilize the regime.
Authoritarianism is best understood not by type, but by five dimensions that are both strengths and weaknesses: the repressive apparatus, cash flow, control over life chances, legitimacy narratives, and the international order. This framework allows for targeted policy action against a regime's specific vulnerabilities.
Instead of pursuing overt regime change or democracy promotion, a more effective U.S. policy is 'political deterrence.' This involves exploiting the inherent rivalries and disaffection within authoritarian regimes to throw them off balance, creating leverage for negotiations from a position of strength.
Criticisms of a president's 'authoritarian tendencies' often miss the historical context. The concentration of power in the executive branch, or 'imperial presidency,' is a long-standing issue in U.S. politics, dating back to at least FDR and Nixon, and is often exacerbated by a weak and ineffective Congress.
Encouraging members of an authoritarian society to defect is futile without a clear alternative. People do not simply defect *from* a regime; they must have something credible to defect *to*. The failure to provide a viable political destination is a critical weakness in many U.S. foreign policy efforts.
The most potent threat to an authoritarian regime comes not from visible dissidents, who are often neutralized, but from patriotic loyalists within the system. These insiders believe the current leadership is corrupt and harming the country, making their patriotism a powerful tool that can be turned against the regime.
The idea of an 'authoritarian bargain'—trading freedom for prosperity—is a myth. Autocrats don't need GDP growth; they need direct cash flow from sources like oil, hacking, or counterfeiting to fund repression and patronage. This allows them to maintain power even as their country's economy flounders.
Authoritarian power hinges on 'control over life chances'—dictating access to jobs, housing, and education. A robust private sector creates alternative paths for citizens, diminishing the state's leverage. Fostering private enterprise is therefore a subtle but effective tool for eroding an autocrat's grip on society.
The USSR's relatively peaceful end was possible because many elites wanted to join the West. This created an internal pull towards capitulation. In contrast, regimes in China and Iran are built on anti-Western ideologies, making their elites far less likely to be co-opted and their regimes much harder to influence or change.