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The USSR's relatively peaceful end was possible because many elites wanted to join the West. This created an internal pull towards capitulation. In contrast, regimes in China and Iran are built on anti-Western ideologies, making their elites far less likely to be co-opted and their regimes much harder to influence or change.

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Observing the USSR's fall, the Chinese Communist Party drew key lessons to ensure its survival: use overwhelming force against dissent, prioritize the Party's power monopoly even at the cost of economic efficiency, and aggressively assimilate ethnic minorities to prevent separatism.

Despite widespread protests, Iran's repressive state apparatus is highly effective and has shown no signs of cracking. The probability of the regime collapsing from internal pressure alone is extremely low. Niall Ferguson argues that only external intervention, a form of 'regime alteration,' can realistically topple the Islamic Republic.

The ruling elite has inverted from 80% ideologues at the revolution's start to 80% charlatans today. Expedience and financial gain, not revolutionary zeal, now bind the regime's core. This ideological hollowness makes the regime more brittle than its rhetoric suggests.

Historical data since World War II shows that when authoritarian regimes fall, they lead to a stable democracy only about 20% of the time. The most common outcome—in over 80% of cases—is the replacement of one authoritarian system with another, a sobering statistic for post-regime change planning in countries like Iran.

Unlike regimes centered on a single dictator like Saddam Hussein, Iran's power structure is a complex, institutionalized relationship between its clerical and military establishments. This distributed power makes the regime resilient to 'decapitation' strikes aimed at killing senior leaders, as there is no single point of failure.

The West's Cold War fear was that countries would fall to communism one by one. Ironically, the domino effect occurred in reverse. Once democratic reforms began in Poland, the movement spread rapidly, causing the entire Soviet empire in Eastern Europe to crumble.

Unlike the Soviet Union's missionary zeal to spread communism, China does not want other nations to become Chinese. Its worldview is centered on being the 'Middle Kingdom'—the sun which others orbit. It desires respect and a preeminent position, not to export its political system.

A dominant system, like the Soviet Union, doesn't simply die; it collapses when its people can envision and transition to a viable alternative (e.g., the US model). The current US-led order faces multiple potential successors—crypto, China's centralized model—which accelerates its potential decline.

Ayatollah Khamenei believes that any attempt at reform, like Gorbachev's in the USSR, would accelerate the regime's collapse rather than prolong it. This formative experience informs his rigid refusal to cede ground on core principles like the mandatory hijab, ensuring a brutal response to dissent.

The 47-year rule of the Islamic Republic has had a paradoxical effect. The oppressive theocracy has led to a population that is now arguably the most secular in the Middle East and, despite its anti-American government, one of the most pro-American populations in the region, desperate to separate mosque and state.