Despite accumulating massive deposits (100 trillion RMB), Chinese households are reluctant to spend. This is driven by the need to "self-insure" due to a limited social safety net and concerns over wealth destruction from the property downturn. Boosting consumption requires structural policy changes, not just stimulus.
Aggregate economic data looks positive because the top 10% of households drive consumption. However, the bottom 90% are experiencing financial distress, which is reflected in negative consumer sentiment. The 'average' consumer experience doesn't exist, leading to a disconnect between official statistics and public perception.
The resilience of consumer spending, despite weak employment growth, is driven by affluent consumers liquidating assets or drawing down cash. This balance sheet-driven consumption explains why traditional income-based models (like savings rates) are failing to predict a slowdown.
The policy restricted developer borrowing to curb speculation but failed to address the core drivers: households' need for a savings vehicle and local governments' dependency on land sales for revenue. By attacking the intermediary, the policy caused a crisis without solving the fundamental problem.
While high-income spending remains stable, the next wave of consumption growth will stem from a recovery in the middle-income segment. This rebound will be driven by stabilizing factors like reduced policy uncertainty and neutral monetary policy, not a major labor market acceleration.
China's policy to combat deflation focuses on cutting excess industrial capacity. However, this is deemed insufficient because the root cause is weak aggregate demand. A sustainable solution requires boosting consumption through social welfare, an approach policymakers seem hesitant to implement on a large scale.
The hukou system links social welfare benefits to one's hometown, not their place of work. Migrant workers in cities are thus excluded from local safety nets, compelling them to invest heavily in real estate as a private substitute for state-provided welfare, healthcare, and retirement security.
The U.S. has "asset feudalism" (propping up the S&P), while China has "factory feudalism" (subsidizing exports). All these systems concentrate wealth and power, leaving the bottom 90% of the population with little capacity to consume, which leads to global stagnation.
China’s economic strategy prioritizes technology and manufacturing competitiveness, assuming this will create a virtuous cycle of profits, jobs, and consumption. The key risk is that automated, high-tech manufacturing may not generate enough jobs to significantly boost household income, causing consumer spending to lag behind industrial growth.
Despite strong export-led growth in Asia, the benefits did not trickle down to households. Weak household income and consumption prompted governments and central banks to implement fiscal support and monetary easing. This disconnect between headline GDP and domestic demand is a critical factor for understanding Asian economic policy.
Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.