China's policy to combat deflation focuses on cutting excess industrial capacity. However, this is deemed insufficient because the root cause is weak aggregate demand. A sustainable solution requires boosting consumption through social welfare, an approach policymakers seem hesitant to implement on a large scale.
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From China's perspective, producing more than it needs and exporting at cutthroat prices is a strategic tool, not an economic problem. This form of industrial warfare is designed to weaken other nations' manufacturing bases, prioritizing geopolitical goals over profit.
For commodities to benefit from reflation, rising inflation alone is not sufficient. It must be accompanied by a genuine economic and industrial rebound, indicated by rising Purchasing Managers' Indexes (PMIs). This combination dramatically improves commodity returns, especially for energy and industrial metals.
China’s economic strategy prioritizes technology and manufacturing competitiveness, assuming this will create a virtuous cycle of profits, jobs, and consumption. The key risk is that automated, high-tech manufacturing may not generate enough jobs to significantly boost household income, causing consumer spending to lag behind industrial growth.
Despite Japan breaking its deflationary cycle, the Bank of Japan is hesitant to raise rates. The current inflation is primarily attributed to a weak yen and supply-side factors like energy costs, not robust consumer demand. With real consumption still below pre-COVID levels, the central bank remains cautious.
Despite strong export-led growth in Asia, the benefits did not trickle down to households. Weak household income and consumption prompted governments and central banks to implement fiscal support and monetary easing. This disconnect between headline GDP and domestic demand is a critical factor for understanding Asian economic policy.
China's economic structure, which funnels state-backed capital into sectors like EVs, inherently creates overinvestment and excess capacity. This distorted cost of capital leads to hyper-competitive industries, making it difficult for even successful companies to generate predictable, growing returns for shareholders.
Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.
China deliberately maintains an undervalued renminbi to make its exports cheaper globally. This strategy props up its manufacturing-led growth model, even though it hinders economic rebalancing and reduces the purchasing power of its own citizens.
The dramatic drop in China's Fixed Asset Investment isn't a sign of economic failure. Instead, it reflects a deliberate government-led "anti-involution" campaign to strip out industrial overcapacity. This painful but planned adjustment aims to create a more streamlined, profitable economy, fundamentally reordering its growth model away from sheer volume.
Even if China could fully automate production to offset its shrinking workforce, its economic model would still collapse. AI and robots cannot replace the essential roles of human consumers, taxpayers, and parents, which are necessary for economic vitality, government revenue, and generational replacement.
