Despite strong export-led growth in Asia, the benefits did not trickle down to households. Weak household income and consumption prompted governments and central banks to implement fiscal support and monetary easing. This disconnect between headline GDP and domestic demand is a critical factor for understanding Asian economic policy.
Despite official statements against rapid currency depreciation in Japan and Korea, policymakers likely view a weaker currency as a beneficial stimulus. With negative output gaps and competition from China, the goal is not to reverse the trend but to manage its pace to avoid market disorder and US Treasury scrutiny.
Canada's recent strong GDP and jobs reports are misleading. A deeper look reveals GDP growth was driven by net exports while domestic consumption fell. Likewise, the job gains were exclusively part-time, with full-time employment declining, signaling a fragile underlying economy.
A recent global fixed income sell-off was not triggered by a single U.S. event but by a cascade of disparate actions from central banks and data releases in smaller economies like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. This decentralized shift is an unusual dynamic for markets, leading to dollar weakness.
Despite America's high standard of living, decades of wage stagnation have created a national psychology of pessimism. Conversely, China's explosive wage growth, even from a lower base, fosters optimism. This psychological dimension, driven by the *trajectory* of wealth, is a powerful and often overlooked political force.
Investors fixate on Japan's high sovereign debt. However, Wagner points out that the central bank owns a large portion. More importantly, the corporate and household sectors are net cash positive, making the overall economy far less levered than the single headline number suggests.
Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.
According to IMF data analysis, China's manufacturing surplus as a share of its GDP has surpassed 2%, exceeding the levels of Japan and Germany during their most dominant export eras. This indicates China is achieving global manufacturing dominance at a scale and speed that is historically unprecedented, fundamentally altering global trade dynamics.
China deliberately maintains an undervalued renminbi to make its exports cheaper globally. This strategy props up its manufacturing-led growth model, even though it hinders economic rebalancing and reduces the purchasing power of its own citizens.
The disinflationary impact from goods prices has largely run its course in emerging markets. The remaining inflation is concentrated in the service sector, which is sticky and less responsive to monetary policy. This structural shift means the broad rate-cutting cycle is nearing its end, as central banks have limited tools to address services inflation.
When countries run large, structural government deficits, their policy options become limited. Historically, this state of 'fiscal dominance' leads to the implementation of capital controls and other financial frictions to prevent capital flight and manage the currency, increasing risks for investors.