Due to financial repression and a lack of viable investment alternatives, Chinese households rationally pour savings into property, often leaving them vacant. This creates an affordability crisis for those needing a home, alongside a massive inventory of empty apartments held as investments.
The immense profitability of real estate in China created a gravitational pull for capital and talent. Productive companies diverted resources to start real estate side-businesses, and entrepreneurs abandoned other sectors, resulting in a net drag on national productivity and innovation.
The policy restricted developer borrowing to curb speculation but failed to address the core drivers: households' need for a savings vehicle and local governments' dependency on land sales for revenue. By attacking the intermediary, the policy caused a crisis without solving the fundamental problem.
While local policies like zoning are often blamed for housing crises, the problem's prevalence across vastly different economies and regulatory environments suggests it's a global phenomenon. This points to systemic drivers beyond local supply constraints, such as global capital flows into real estate.
Singapore's government builds and sells most housing through its Development Board. It restricts ownership to one unit per citizen and allows sales only within a closed market of residents. This effectively divorces the function of shelter from the speculative pressures seen in other global cities.
The hukou system links social welfare benefits to one's hometown, not their place of work. Migrant workers in cities are thus excluded from local safety nets, compelling them to invest heavily in real estate as a private substitute for state-provided welfare, healthcare, and retirement security.
In the late 1980s, facing a lack of capital, China began experimenting with Hong Kong's model of leasing state-owned land. This became the primary financing mechanism for local governments, especially after a 1994 tax reform limited their revenue, fueling decades of rapid urban development.
A 1994 reform shifted tax revenues to China's central government while leaving spending obligations at the local level. This created a structural deficit for municipalities, forcing them to rely on off-balance-sheet land lease auctions as their primary source of funding, which in turn fueled the property bubble.