The idea that airstrikes can decapitate the Iranian regime is a fallacy. The IRGC's influence is too deeply embedded within the society and its institutions. Killing leaders at the top will not remove this "rot," and the IRGC will simply re-constitute control, likely in an even more repressive form.

Iran's military structure is intentionally decentralized, ensuring that if central leadership is eliminated, autonomous units can continue to operate based on pre-established directives. This resilience makes traditional 'decapitation strikes' less effective and prolongs conflict.

Targeting a regime's leader, assuming it will cause collapse, is a fallacy. Resilient, adaptive regimes often replace the fallen leader with a more aggressive individual who is incentivized to lash back simply to establish their own credibility and power.

Unlike regimes centered on a single dictator like Saddam Hussein, Iran's power structure is a complex, institutionalized relationship between its clerical and military establishments. This distributed power makes the regime resilient to 'decapitation' strikes aimed at killing senior leaders, as there is no single point of failure.

The Trump administration's apparent strategy of decapitating leadership to find a compliant successor is unlikely to work in Iran. Unlike Venezuela, Iran's power is deeply institutionalized, it lacks an obvious cooperative figure, and potential US targets for that role have already been eliminated.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful institution, is the true kingmaker. A Supreme Leader without the IRGC's backing is effectively powerless, regardless of constitutional or religious standing. This makes any assassination of the leader a less effective strategy for regime change.

Targeting senior leaders in regimes that operate on an irregular warfare model is a flawed strategy. These governments anticipate such attacks and have shadow leadership structures in place, ensuring operational continuity and rendering decapitation strikes futile.

The US strategy in Cuba may not be to oust the Castro family entirely, but to replace the current president while leaving the core power structure and even Castro relatives intact. This mirrors the approach in Venezuela, suggesting a pragmatic rather than purely ideological goal.

Unlike 20th-century bombing campaigns, modern precision-strike capabilities allow for targeting a country's entire leadership from a distance. This strategy, lacking a plan for subsequent governance, represents a largely untested and rare event in military history.