Anticipating attacks aimed at killing its leaders, Iran structured its military into 31 independent, self-sufficient divisions, one for each province. To win, an invading force must defeat all 31 units, neutralizing the common strategy of targeting central command.

The idea that airstrikes can decapitate the Iranian regime is a fallacy. The IRGC's influence is too deeply embedded within the society and its institutions. Killing leaders at the top will not remove this "rot," and the IRGC will simply re-constitute control, likely in an even more repressive form.

Despite widespread protests, Iran's repressive state apparatus is highly effective and has shown no signs of cracking. The probability of the regime collapsing from internal pressure alone is extremely low. Niall Ferguson argues that only external intervention, a form of 'regime alteration,' can realistically topple the Islamic Republic.

Unlike regimes centered on a single dictator like Saddam Hussein, Iran's power structure is a complex, institutionalized relationship between its clerical and military establishments. This distributed power makes the regime resilient to 'decapitation' strikes aimed at killing senior leaders, as there is no single point of failure.

The Trump administration's apparent strategy of decapitating leadership to find a compliant successor is unlikely to work in Iran. Unlike Venezuela, Iran's power is deeply institutionalized, it lacks an obvious cooperative figure, and potential US targets for that role have already been eliminated.

Targeting senior leaders in regimes that operate on an irregular warfare model is a flawed strategy. These governments anticipate such attacks and have shadow leadership structures in place, ensuring operational continuity and rendering decapitation strikes futile.

Iran has anticipated leadership decapitation strikes for decades, building a resilient and distributed command and control infrastructure. This allows its forces, particularly the IRGC, to continue operating and launching attacks even without direct contact with headquarters.

Iran's military is split into 31 provincial commands with pre-authorized launch orders. This structure makes it resilient to leadership assassinations, as there's no central "kill switch," complicating any military exit strategy for opposing forces.

The US presumed a 'decapitation strike' would cause the Iranian regime to collapse from internal mismanagement and popular unrest. This proved false, as the regime's institutionalization and resilience were severely underestimated, leading to a protracted conflict for Washington.