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Anticipating attacks aimed at killing its leaders, Iran structured its military into 31 independent, self-sufficient divisions, one for each province. To win, an invading force must defeat all 31 units, neutralizing the common strategy of targeting central command.

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The idea that airstrikes can decapitate the Iranian regime is a fallacy. The IRGC's influence is too deeply embedded within the society and its institutions. Killing leaders at the top will not remove this "rot," and the IRGC will simply re-constitute control, likely in an even more repressive form.

Engaging a military with a decentralized command structure is perilous because there's no central authority for negotiation. Even if leadership is neutralized, autonomous cells can continue fighting, creating an unwinnable "headless chicken" scenario where a ceasefire is impossible to implement.

Unlike regimes centered on a single dictator like Saddam Hussein, Iran's power structure is a complex, institutionalized relationship between its clerical and military establishments. This distributed power makes the regime resilient to 'decapitation' strikes aimed at killing senior leaders, as there is no single point of failure.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful institution, is the true kingmaker. A Supreme Leader without the IRGC's backing is effectively powerless, regardless of constitutional or religious standing. This makes any assassination of the leader a less effective strategy for regime change.

A clean, external removal of Iran's leadership, similar to what occurred in Venezuela, is unlikely. Iran's population is nearly four times larger, it is geographically distant, and the American political psyche associates the Middle East with costly military entanglements, creating a much higher barrier to intervention.

Targeting senior leaders in regimes that operate on an irregular warfare model is a flawed strategy. These governments anticipate such attacks and have shadow leadership structures in place, ensuring operational continuity and rendering decapitation strikes futile.

Iran has anticipated leadership decapitation strikes for decades, building a resilient and distributed command and control infrastructure. This allows its forces, particularly the IRGC, to continue operating and launching attacks even without direct contact with headquarters.

The hope that airstrikes can catalyze a popular uprising for regime change is historically unfounded. Unlike in Afghanistan or Libya where local ground forces existed, there is no organized army on the ground in Iran to capitalize on air power, making a decapitation strategy highly unlikely to succeed.

Iran's military is split into 31 provincial commands with pre-authorized launch orders. This structure makes it resilient to leadership assassinations, as there's no central "kill switch," complicating any military exit strategy for opposing forces.

The war on Iran was a "war of choice" based on a flawed assumption of imminent regime collapse. Burns argues the Iranian regime is designed to withstand decapitation and predictably reacted by regionalizing the conflict to inflict economic and political pain on its adversaries.

Iran's Decentralized Military Structure Thwarts Traditional 'Decapitation' Strikes | RiffOn