Profitable Chinese giants like ByteDance trade at a fraction of their Western counterparts' multiples. This "China discount" stems not from business fundamentals but from the unpredictable risk of the Communist Party "smiting" successful companies and overarching geopolitical tensions, making them un-investable for many.
For D1 Capital, the primary risk in China isn't economic but political. The government's ability to arbitrarily influence resource allocation, punish successful companies, and eliminate entire sectors without due process creates an unacceptable level of uncertainty for capital allocators, regardless of how cheap valuations become.
Contrary to the growth narrative, the MSCI China index returned just 3.4% over the last decade with over 24% volatility. During the same period, the emerging market ex-China index delivered a higher return of 4.8% with significantly lower volatility (17.5%), highlighting structural headwinds in China for investors.
Contrary to her buy-and-hold reputation, Cathie Wood is actively managing risk by selling shares of top performers like Roku. She is reallocating that capital into out-of-favor Chinese tech companies like Alibaba and Baidu, signaling a tactical portfolio rotation despite geopolitical risks.
The podcast reveals a key insight into China's geopolitical strategy. Xi Jinping privately dismissed TikTok as "spiritual opium," a low-cost asset he was willing to sacrifice. The sale was not a major loss but an easy concession to secure continued dialogue with the U.S. on more critical issues, reframing the event as a calculated move.
The number of startups founded in China dropped from 51,000 in 2018 to just 1,200 in 2023, a 98% decrease. Roelof Botha attributes this collapse to unpredictable government regulations that stifle entrepreneurial risk-taking, serving as a warning for how policy could impact innovation elsewhere.
The valuation gap between Airwallex ($8B) and Ramp ($32B), which have comparable revenues, demonstrates a tangible "Asia discount." Investors significantly mark down companies with a strong presence or founding nexus in Asia due to perceived geopolitical and data security risks.
Following a 30-40% valuation surge in 2025, China's market is expected to stabilize. Further upside in 2026 will depend on corporate earnings, projected at a modest 6%, signaling a shift from a valuation-driven to an earnings-driven market that requires a different investment approach.
Chinese policymakers champion AI as a key driver of economic productivity but appear to be underestimating its potential for social upheaval. There is little indication they are planning for the mass displacement of the gig economy workforce, who will be the first casualties of automation. This focus on technological gains over social safety nets creates a significant future political risk.
While the U.S. AI strategy pursues a 'winner-take-all' model leading to high profits, China's state-backed approach aims to commoditize AI. By spreading resources across many players to create a low-cost, replicable model for export, it structurally limits the potential for monopoly profits to accrue to shareholders.
China's economic structure, which funnels state-backed capital into sectors like EVs, inherently creates overinvestment and excess capacity. This distorted cost of capital leads to hyper-competitive industries, making it difficult for even successful companies to generate predictable, growing returns for shareholders.