A serial entrepreneur concluded his pursuit of high-risk, VC-backed startups was statistically irrational. He compares it to being "the idiot at the craps table" versus private equity firms, which act as "the house" by acquiring already profitable businesses and eliminating the risk of total failure.
Focusing only on trendy sectors leads to intense competition where the vast majority of startups fail. True opportunity lies in contrarian ideas that others overlook or dismiss, as these markets have fewer competitors.
The 'classic' VC model hunts for unproven talent in niche areas. The now-dominant 'super compounder' model argues the biggest market inefficiency is underestimating the best companies. This justifies investing in obvious winners at any price, believing that outlier returns will cover the high entry cost.
The memo details how investors rationalize enormous funding rounds for pre-product startups. By focusing on a colossal potential outcome (e.g., a $1 trillion valuation) and assuming even a minuscule probability (e.g., 0.1%), the calculated expected value can justify the investment, compelling participation despite the overwhelming odds of failure.
Club Penguin's co-founder warns that accepting VC money creates immense pressure to become a billion-dollar company. This often crushes otherwise successful businesses that could have been profitable at a smaller scale, making founders worse off in the long run.
Contrary to popular belief, successful entrepreneurs are not reckless risk-takers. They are experts at systematically eliminating risk. They validate demand before building, structure deals to minimize capital outlay (e.g., leasing planes), and enter markets with weak competition. Their goal is to win with the least possible exposure.
A common mistake in venture capital is investing too early based on founder pedigree or gut feel, which is akin to 'shooting in the dark'. A more disciplined private equity approach waits for companies to establish repeatable, business-driven key performance metrics before committing capital, reducing portfolio variance.
Botha argues venture capital isn't a scalable asset class. Despite massive capital inflows (~$250B/year), the number of significant ($1B+) exits hasn't increased from ~20 per year. The math for industry-wide returns doesn't work, making it a "return-free risk" for many LPs.
Investors should seek "boring" companies that are well-oiled machines with repeatable processes and disciplined execution. The goal is consistency in outcomes, not operational excitement. Predictable, relentless execution is what generates outsized, "exciting" returns.
Lior Susan highlights the biggest mental hurdle for former operators becoming VCs: internalizing the power law. Operators are builders wired to fix problems and believe they can turn any situation around. In VC, success is driven by a few massive outliers, requiring focus on winners, not on fixing every company.
The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.