Botha argues venture capital isn't a scalable asset class. Despite massive capital inflows (~$250B/year), the number of significant ($1B+) exits hasn't increased from ~20 per year. The math for industry-wide returns doesn't work, making it a "return-free risk" for many LPs.

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Navan's post-IPO stock drop, despite strong revenue, is a troubling sign for the venture ecosystem. It highlights that even a multi-billion-dollar outcome can be considered a 'bummer' and may not generate sufficient returns for large, late-stage funds, resetting expectations for what constitutes a truly successful exit in the current market.

Many sub-$500M venture funds are over-invested and under-reserved. While venture capitalists like Josh Wolfe predict a 50% failure rate for these "minnows," the Limited Partners (LPs) who fund them are even more bearish, believing the involuntary extinction rate will be closer to 90%.

The primary risk to a VC fund's performance isn't its absolute size but rather a dramatic increase (e.g., doubling) from one fund to the next. This forces firms to change their strategy and write larger checks than their conviction muscle is built for.

PE firms are struggling to sell assets acquired in 2020-21, causing distributions to plummet from 30% to 10% annually. This cash crunch prevents investors from re-upping into new funds, shrinking the pool of capital and further depressing the PE-to-PE exit market, trapping investor money.

The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.

Aggregate venture capital investment figures are misleading. The market is becoming bimodal: a handful of elite AI companies absorb a disproportionate share of capital, while the vast majority of other startups, including 900+ unicorns, face a tougher fundraising and exit environment.

The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.

Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.

The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.

AI startups' explosive growth ($1M to $100M ARR in 2 years) will make venture's power law even more extreme. LPs may need a new evaluation model, underwriting VCs across "bundles of three funds" where they expect two modest performers (e.g., 1.5x) and one massive outlier (10x) to drive overall returns.

Venture Capital Fails as an 'Asset Class' as Exit Volume Stagnates Despite Funding Boom | RiffOn