The memo details how investors rationalize enormous funding rounds for pre-product startups. By focusing on a colossal potential outcome (e.g., a $1 trillion valuation) and assuming even a minuscule probability (e.g., 0.1%), the calculated expected value can justify the investment, compelling participation despite the overwhelming odds of failure.
Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.
Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.
Founders in deep tech and space are moving beyond traditional TAM analysis. They justify high valuations by pitching narratives of creating entirely new markets, like interplanetary humanity or space-based data centers. This shifts the conversation from 'what is the market?' to 'what could the market become?'.
Valuations don't jump dramatically; they 'sneak up on you.' An investor might balk at a $45M cap when they expected $40M. But the fear of missing a potential unicorn is stronger than the desire for a slightly better price, causing a gradual, batch-over-batch inflation of valuation norms.
Startup valuation calculators are systematically biased towards optimism. Their datasets are built on companies that successfully secured funding, excluding the vast majority that did not. This means the resulting valuations reflect only the "winners," creating an inflated perception of worth.
For a proven, hyper-growth AI company, traditional business risks (market, operational, tech) are minimal. The sole risk for a late-stage investor is overpaying for several years of future growth that may decelerate faster than anticipated.
Speculation is not an evil byproduct of innovation but its necessary component. Groundbreaking ventures like SpaceX are impossible without investors willing to bet on seemingly crazy ideas. The goal for policymakers shouldn't be to eliminate speculation, but to manage its excesses without killing the innovation it fuels.
The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.
The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.
The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.