The U.S. Navy's ability to track Soviet submarines while keeping its own hidden threatened the USSR's second-strike capability, the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. This technological and financial asymmetry pushed the Soviets toward de-escalation and ultimately, ending the war.

For a blueprint on AI governance, look to Cold War-era geopolitics, not just tech history. The 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, which established cooperation between the US and Soviet Union, shows that global compromise on new frontiers is possible even amidst intense rivalry. It provides a model for political, not just technical, solutions.

The path to surviving superintelligence is political: a global pact to halt its development, mirroring Cold War nuclear strategy. Success hinges on all leaders understanding that anyone building it ensures their own personal destruction, removing any incentive to cheat.

PGIM's Daleep Singh argues that the risk of mutually assured destruction prevents direct military conflict between nuclear powers. This channels confrontation into the economic sphere, using tools like sanctions and trade policy as primary weapons of statecraft.

Contrary to fears of digital takeover, the US submarine-launched ballistic missile system is deliberately analog. Its primary navigation method is "star sighting"—an ancient technique—making it resilient to hacking and external digital control, a fusion of primitive and advanced technology for ultimate security.

The belief that AI development is unstoppable ignores history. Global treaties successfully limited nuclear proliferation, phased out ozone-depleting CFCs, and banned blinding lasers. These precedents prove that coordinated international action can steer powerful technologies away from the worst outcomes.

Nuclear deterrence works because the weapons provide a "crystal ball effect." Unlike WWI leaders who couldn't foresee 1918's carnage, modern leaders have a stark, pessimistic view of a nuclear war's outcome. This shared vision of guaranteed calamity creates enormous incentives to avoid starting such a conflict.

International AI treaties, particularly with nations like China, are unlikely to hold based on trust alone. A stable agreement requires a mutually-assured-destruction-style dynamic, meaning the U.S. must develop and signal credible offensive capabilities to deter cheating.

Unlike China's historical "minimal deterrence" (surviving a first strike to retaliate), the US and Russia operate on "damage limitation"—using nukes to destroy the enemy's arsenal. This logic inherently drives a numbers game, fueling an arms race as each side seeks to counter the other's growing stockpile.