The Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates that the first move in modern warfare is often a cyberattack to disable critical systems like logistics and communication. This is a low-cost, high-impact method to immobilize an adversary before physical engagement.

The U.S. Navy's ability to track Soviet submarines while keeping its own hidden threatened the USSR's second-strike capability, the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. This technological and financial asymmetry pushed the Soviets toward de-escalation and ultimately, ending the war.

While modernizing nuclear command and control systems seems logical, their current antiquated state offers a paradoxical security benefit. Sam Harris suggests this technological obsolescence makes them less vulnerable to modern hacking techniques, creating an unintentional layer of safety against cyber-initiated launches.

Defense Unicorns tackles the key defense tech challenge: getting modern software to run on disconnected, outdated hardware operated by non-IT soldiers. The problem isn't the software itself, but the difficult deployment environment that commercial tech avoids.

The popular scenario of an AI taking control of nuclear arsenals is less plausible than imagined. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communication (NC3) systems are profoundly classified and intentionally analog, precisely to prevent the kind of digital takeover an AI would require.

Instead of matching China's manufacturing output one-for-one, the US should pursue an asymmetric strategy. This involves leveraging American ingenuity to create superior, low-cost countermeasures, like undefeatable missiles, that neutralize a volume advantage.

Nuclear submarines can stay submerged for 90 days, limited by their food supply, not energy. The onboard nuclear reactor provides limitless power to convert seawater into breathable air and water, demonstrating how a single technological leap can completely redefine a system's constraints.

Supply chain vulnerability isn't just about individual parts. The real test is whether a complex defense system, like a directed energy weapon, can be manufactured *entirely* from components sourced within the U.S. or from unshakeable allies. Currently, this is not possible, representing a critical security gap.

Military balloons, a technology from the 1700s, are making a high-tech comeback. Armed forces are developing them as cost-effective platforms for surveillance, guiding munitions, and even deploying armed drones behind enemy lines. They fill a strategic gap between traditional aircraft and satellites, especially for persistent, low-altitude surveillance.