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Ben Isaac says many UK governance problems come from stewardship habits, not bad intent. He looks for win-win fixes such as better disclosure, incentives, and capital allocation where management is receptive and the core business is already performing; these are often relatively easy fixes available.
Unlike the US, where shareholder activism is common, UK culture discourages confrontation, described as not wanting to "raise your head above the parapet." This cultural barrier contributes to board and management complacency, allowing undervaluation to persist without challenge.
Ben Isaac says just 10% of UK listed companies require directors to own stock. That does not make directors bad, but it creates different incentives, so he looks for receptive companies and builds stakes over time as management and the board show willingness to engage meaningfully.
The structure of public company boards often fails to align with shareholder interests. Directors are highly compensated regardless of performance and often lack significant personal investment, creating a culture of complacency where they act as a rubber stamp for management rather than a check on power.
Counterintuitively, companies with 'bad' governance ratings have financially outperformed those with 'good' ratings since 2008. This suggests that so-called 'best practices' often enforce short-termism, while 'bad' governance can actually protect a company's long-term, value-creating mission.
In a striking cultural difference from the US, some UK board members justify not owning shares by claiming it would create a conflict of interest. This reveals a fundamental misalignment with shareholders and a weak governance culture that tolerates such excuses.
Financial reporting often misses the crucial details of governance. Whether founders or investors control the board can be a more telling indicator of a company's long-term trajectory than the size of its funding rounds.
Data since 2008 shows that companies with so-called "bad governance"—often founder-controlled with less board independence—have, in aggregate, financially outperformed those following conventional "good governance" best practices, challenging the entire framework.
CEOs are often exceptional at building relationships, which can co-opt a board of directors. Directors become friends, lose objectivity, and avoid tough conversations about performance or succession, ultimately failing in their governance duties because they "just want them to win."
Investment research suggests the significant performance signal in governance isn't achieving a perfect score, but rather avoiding companies in the worst decile. The key is to steer clear of clear red flags—like misaligned boards or poor capital allocation—as this is where underperformance is most clearly correlated.
An activist investor admits their level of agitation against poor corporate governance rises significantly only when a stock is underperforming. When performance is strong, even clear governance issues are often tolerated, revealing a pragmatic rather than purely principled approach to engagement.