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Ben Isaac says just 10% of UK listed companies require directors to own stock. That does not make directors bad, but it creates different incentives, so he looks for receptive companies and builds stakes over time as management and the board show willingness to engage meaningfully.

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Unlike the US, where shareholder activism is common, UK culture discourages confrontation, described as not wanting to "raise your head above the parapet." This cultural barrier contributes to board and management complacency, allowing undervaluation to persist without challenge.

The structure of public company boards often fails to align with shareholder interests. Directors are highly compensated regardless of performance and often lack significant personal investment, creating a culture of complacency where they act as a rubber stamp for management rather than a check on power.

Liberty Global's board is filled with long-serving directors, many in their 70s and 80s, with relatively low stock ownership. In a controlled company, this composition suggests a lack of fresh perspectives and alignment, potentially enabling a long track record of value destruction to continue unchecked without pushback on management.

To ensure true alignment and 'skin in the game,' offer proven managers the opportunity to buy into the HoldCo's equity rather than giving them stock grants. People value what they pay for, creating a stronger sense of ownership and long-term commitment.

Unlike public companies where directors receive substantial cash and stock, independent directors at early-stage startups are primarily compensated with equity. A typical grant is around 0.1% of the company, vesting over a two-year period. Significant cash compensation is rare until the pre-IPO stage.

A board composed of long-tenured, retirement-age directors with minimal stock ownership is a significant governance risk. This structure can lead to complacency and an inability to adapt to rapid technological shifts like AI, potentially prioritizing stability over shareholder value creation.

The "best practice" of loading boards with independent directors is flawed because they often lack significant ownership. Their loyalty trends towards the norms of the broader financial system and their professional network, rather than the unique, long-term mission of the company they govern.

In a striking cultural difference from the US, some UK board members justify not owning shares by claiming it would create a conflict of interest. This reveals a fundamental misalignment with shareholders and a weak governance culture that tolerates such excuses.

Given the UK market's historically weak management incentives and poor corporate governance, a crucial first-pass filter is to screen out companies without significant insider ownership. Jonathan Cohen uses a strict threshold of over $1 million to ensure alignment between management and shareholders.

Ben Isaac says many UK governance problems come from stewardship habits, not bad intent. He looks for win-win fixes such as better disclosure, incentives, and capital allocation where management is receptive and the core business is already performing; these are often relatively easy fixes available.