Reed Hastings argues board members lack daily context to add value with advice. Their true function is to be an "insurance layer," with their most crucial responsibility being the decision to replace the CEO if needed. They must learn the business not to advise, but to be prepared for that moment.

According to Snap's Chairman Michael Lynton, a board chair's biggest mistakes are not operational but governmental. Their key role is to manage the board itself—by ensuring the right questions are asked of management and, crucially, by preventing individual board members from meddling in company operations.

The "best practice" of loading boards with independent directors is flawed because they often lack significant ownership. Their loyalty trends towards the norms of the broader financial system and their professional network, rather than the unique, long-term mission of the company they govern.

While intended to kill bad ideas, review committees are often populated by executives who remain in place permanently. They use the board to make numerous small bets, claiming victory for the few that succeed while blaming others for failures. This behavior prioritizes personal prestige over sound investment strategy.

Data since 2008 shows that companies with so-called "bad governance"—often founder-controlled with less board independence—have, in aggregate, financially outperformed those following conventional "good governance" best practices, challenging the entire framework.

CEOs are often exceptional at building relationships, which can co-opt a board of directors. Directors become friends, lose objectivity, and avoid tough conversations about performance or succession, ultimately failing in their governance duties because they "just want them to win."

Investment research suggests the significant performance signal in governance isn't achieving a perfect score, but rather avoiding companies in the worst decile. The key is to steer clear of clear red flags—like misaligned boards or poor capital allocation—as this is where underperformance is most clearly correlated.

Spinoza's concept of "canatus" (striving) highlights how misalignment between individual goals (e.g., a CEO's reputation) and the organization's goals (shareholder returns) creates agency problems that damage the entire enterprise, underscoring the critical need for incentive alignment.

Passive funds from firms like Vanguard and Blackrock outsource their proxy voting to advisors like ISS. These advisors advocate for shareholder primacy in ways that are often inversely correlated with long-term value creation, distorting corporate governance at a massive scale.