Analysis in Japan reveals a direct positive correlation between improved corporate governance metrics, such as board independence, and equity returns. This suggests that governance reforms across Asia are not just about compliance but are a tangible source of investment alpha for discerning investors.

An alternative corporate structure where a for-profit company is overseen by a nonprofit foundation (e.g., Zeiss, Novo Nordisk, Hershey's) dramatically increases longevity. Data shows these companies have a 60% chance of reaching age 50, versus just 10% for conventional firms.

Top-performing, founder-led businesses often don't want to sell control. A non-control investment strategy allows access to this exclusive deal flow, tapping into the "founder alpha" from high skin-in-the-game leaders who consistently outperform hired CEOs.

The "best practice" of loading boards with independent directors is flawed because they often lack significant ownership. Their loyalty trends towards the norms of the broader financial system and their professional network, rather than the unique, long-term mission of the company they govern.

Public companies, beholden to quarterly earnings, often behave like "psychopaths," optimizing for short-term metrics at the expense of customer relationships. In contrast, founder-led or family-owned firms can invest in long-term customer value, leading to more sustainable success.

The venture capital industry's tendency to fire founders is so ingrained that simply being founder-friendly became a competitive advantage for Founders Fund. Despite data showing founder-led companies outperform, the emotional 'thrill' of ousting a founder often leads VCs to make value-destructive decisions, creating a market inefficiency.

CEOs are often exceptional at building relationships, which can co-opt a board of directors. Directors become friends, lose objectivity, and avoid tough conversations about performance or succession, ultimately failing in their governance duties because they "just want them to win."

Investment research suggests the significant performance signal in governance isn't achieving a perfect score, but rather avoiding companies in the worst decile. The key is to steer clear of clear red flags—like misaligned boards or poor capital allocation—as this is where underperformance is most clearly correlated.

Boards have a finite 'governance budget'—their collective time, skills, and capacity. This budget must be sufficient to oversee the portfolio's risk. A board with limited capacity cannot effectively govern a high-risk, complex strategy like private equity, creating a critical misalignment that jeopardizes returns.