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Despite rising government defense spending, there's a disconnect with public sentiment in Taiwan. Observers note that everyday Taiwanese people do not display the same level of palpable tension or "battle preparedness" that was seen in Ukraine before the 2022 Russian invasion.

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Beijing’s core strategy for Taiwan is to convince its populace that "resistance is futile" and no outside help is coming. U.S. arms sales and rhetorical support from allies are particularly disruptive because they directly counter this psychological narrative of isolation, undermining China's goal of a coerced unification.

Beijing's timeline for taking Taiwan is shrinking due to a demographic shift on the island. As younger Taiwanese feel increasingly less Chinese, leaders in Beijing fear that the window for any form of peaceful reunification is closing, raising the appeal of military options before a separate identity becomes permanent.

Taiwan's willingness to prepare and fight is heavily predicated on its belief in potential US support. Ambiguous US policy, characterized as a move from 'strategic ambiguity to just ambiguity,' directly erodes Taiwan's domestic resolve and mobilization efforts.

Contrary to concerns that publicizing war preparations would 'spook the population,' Taiwan's President Lai found the public has welcomed overt efforts. Citizens want to be prepared, validating a more direct and public approach to building national resilience.

Contrary to widespread fear, the probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2028 is extremely low (~5%). China believes its goal of 'peaceful reunification' is progressing, its military is in disarray after deep purges, and it views President Trump as an accommodating US leader on the Taiwan issue.

Contrary to popular comparisons with Ukraine, Taiwan has 'zero chance' of defending itself independently. Its entire military posture is designed to hold out long enough for the United States to intervene, not to win a war of self-defense. This makes U.S. intervention speed the critical factor.

Learning from Ukraine's resistance against Russia, Taiwan is shifting its defense strategy from relying on large US arms packages to developing its own indigenous, asymmetric capabilities like drones, anti-ship missiles, and sea mines to counter a numerically superior Chinese force.

Beijing's strategy isn't a single dramatic policy shift but a gradual erosion of the status quo through small changes in diplomatic language and pressure. The primary audience for this psychological campaign is the Taiwanese public, aiming to demoralize them ahead of elections.

Taiwan's increased defense spending and reinstated conscription are not just responses to China's threats. They are primarily driven by a growing perception that the U.S. is an unreliable ally, forcing Taiwan to prioritize military self-sufficiency and develop its own capabilities.

China currently believes its strategy of coercion against Taiwan is succeeding, making a near-term military invasion unlikely. However, 2028 is a critical year. If Taiwan's pro-independence party wins re-election, Beijing may reassess its strategy and consider more dramatic military action.