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Contrary to concerns that publicizing war preparations would 'spook the population,' Taiwan's President Lai found the public has welcomed overt efforts. Citizens want to be prepared, validating a more direct and public approach to building national resilience.

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Lithuania's national security strategy involves preparing every citizen, regardless of age or ability, to resist an invasion. This societal-level readiness, from civilian training to survival planning, acts as a powerful deterrent by signaling that any occupation would face widespread, sustained opposition from the entire population, not just the military.

Beijing’s core strategy for Taiwan is to convince its populace that "resistance is futile" and no outside help is coming. U.S. arms sales and rhetorical support from allies are particularly disruptive because they directly counter this psychological narrative of isolation, undermining China's goal of a coerced unification.

The name change from "Defense" to "War" is a strategic move to instill a warrior mindset internally and project strength externally. The theory is that clearly signaling a readiness and capability to win a conflict is the most effective way to deter one from starting.

Chinese leadership believes time is not on its side regarding Taiwan. The growing sense of a distinct Taiwanese identity, especially among younger generations, creates pressure to act before a political 'reunification' becomes impossible, thus increasing the risk of military action.

Strengthening Taiwan's own defense capabilities directly reduces the risk and burden on US forces in a potential conflict. Dollar for dollar, investing in Taiwan's military could be a more efficient use of funds for US security interests than simply adding more to the US budget.

Taiwan's willingness to prepare and fight is heavily predicated on its belief in potential US support. Ambiguous US policy, characterized as a move from 'strategic ambiguity to just ambiguity,' directly erodes Taiwan's domestic resolve and mobilization efforts.

Contrary to widespread fear, the probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2028 is extremely low (~5%). China believes its goal of 'peaceful reunification' is progressing, its military is in disarray after deep purges, and it views President Trump as an accommodating US leader on the Taiwan issue.

Autocracies can achieve operational surprise, but democracies have a deeper strategic advantage: genuine, voluntary dedication. When attacked, citizens of democracies, from all walks of life, rush to defend their nation with an enthusiasm that cannot be commanded or coerced in an authoritarian state.

Beijing's strategy isn't a single dramatic policy shift but a gradual erosion of the status quo through small changes in diplomatic language and pressure. The primary audience for this psychological campaign is the Taiwanese public, aiming to demoralize them ahead of elections.

China currently believes its strategy of coercion against Taiwan is succeeding, making a near-term military invasion unlikely. However, 2028 is a critical year. If Taiwan's pro-independence party wins re-election, Beijing may reassess its strategy and consider more dramatic military action.