Limited Partners should resist pressuring VCs for early exits to lock in DPI. The best companies compound value at incredible rates, making it optimal to hold winners. Instead, LPs should manage portfolio duration and liquidity by building a balanced portfolio of early-stage, growth, and secondary fund investments.

To ensure genuine collaboration across funds, Centerbridge structures compensation so a "substantial minority" of an individual's pay comes from other areas of the firm. This economic incentive forces a firm-wide perspective and makes being "part of one team" a financial reality, not just a cultural slogan.

After poor performance, a massive GP commit (like Tiger's $400M) is the ultimate signal of conviction. It aligns incentives and proves the manager's belief in a new strategy, acting as a "truth serum" for LPs by showing action, not just words.

Venture capital returns materialize over a decade, making short-term outputs like markups unreliable 'mirages.' Sequoia instead measures partners on tangible inputs. They are reviewed semi-annually on the quality of their decision-making process (e.g., investment memos) and their adherence to core team values, not on premature financial metrics.

Instead of a traditional 100-day plan, TA Associates' value creation process begins by defining what the business must look like in five years to achieve a successful exit. All subsequent initiatives are then mapped backward from this end goal, ensuring every action is aligned with the ultimate liquidity event.

The era of generating returns through leverage and multiple expansion is over. Future success in PE will come from driving revenue growth, entering at lower multiples, and adding operational expertise, particularly in the fragmented middle market where these opportunities are more prevalent.

Structuring compensation around a single, firm-wide P&L, rather than individual deal performance, eliminates internal competition. It forces a culture of true collaboration, as everyone's success is tied together. The system is maintained as a meritocracy by removing underperformers from the 'boat.'

A fund manager's fiduciary duty incentivizes them to trade potentially higher, more volatile returns for guaranteed, quicker multiples (e.g., a 3.5x over a 7x). Unlike a personal investor who can accept high dispersion (big winners, total losses), a GP must prioritize returning capital to LPs like pensions and endowments.

After discovering that buyers of their portfolio companies were achieving 3x returns, TA shifted its strategy. Instead of selling 100%, they now often sell partial stakes. This provides liquidity to LPs and de-risks the investment while allowing TA to capture significant upside from the company's continued compounding growth.