After discovering that buyers of their portfolio companies were achieving 3x returns, TA shifted its strategy. Instead of selling 100%, they now often sell partial stakes. This provides liquidity to LPs and de-risks the investment while allowing TA to capture significant upside from the company's continued compounding growth.
Contrary to the 'get in early' mantra, the certainty of a 3-5x return on a category-defining company like Databricks can be a more attractive investment than a high-risk seed deal. The time and risk-adjusted returns for late-stage winners are often superior.
Limited Partners should resist pressuring VCs for early exits to lock in DPI. The best companies compound value at incredible rates, making it optimal to hold winners. Instead, LPs should manage portfolio duration and liquidity by building a balanced portfolio of early-stage, growth, and secondary fund investments.
The traditional IPO exit is being replaced by a perpetual secondary market for elite private companies. This new paradigm provides liquidity for investors and employees without the high costs and regulatory burdens of going public. This shift fundamentally alters the venture capital lifecycle, enabling longer private holding periods.
Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.
The default VC practice of distributing shares after an IPO lockup can leave massive gains on the table. Missing a multi-billion dollar run-up suggests a more nuanced, case-by-case discussion with LPs is needed, as holding can be the difference between a 5x and a 15x fund.
The standard VC practice of distributing shares to LPs immediately after a lockup expires can be a multi-billion dollar error. The case of selling Reddit at a $9B valuation, only to see it rise much higher, highlights that VCs may need to evolve into holding public positions longer, challenging the traditional model.
The most lucrative exit for a startup is often not an IPO, but an M&A deal within an oligopolistic industry. When 3-4 major players exist, they can be forced into an irrational bidding war driven by the fear of a competitor acquiring the asset, leading to outcomes that are even better than going public.
When a company like Synthesia gets a $3B offer, founder and VC incentives decouple. For a founder with 10% equity, the lifestyle difference between a $300M exit and a potential $1B future exit is minimal. For a VC, that same 3.3x growth can mean the difference between a decent and a great fund return, making them far more willing to gamble.
Instead of a traditional 100-day plan, TA Associates' value creation process begins by defining what the business must look like in five years to achieve a successful exit. All subsequent initiatives are then mapped backward from this end goal, ensuring every action is aligned with the ultimate liquidity event.
TA's compensation structure aligns partner incentives directly with investor returns. The primary way for partners to increase their ownership (carry) is by generating realized gains—i.e., returning capital to Limited Partners. This systemically prioritizes liquidity and successful exits over simply deploying capital or marking up portfolio value on paper.