When purchasing a new ship or aircraft, the initial price tag is deceptive. The 'fully burdened cost' includes long-term expenses for crewing, training, support, and maintenance. A one-time budget increase doesn't cover this tail, forcing the military to retire platforms early and resulting in no net growth of the force.
The conflict in Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of expensive, "exquisite" military platforms (like tanks) to inexpensive technologies (like drones). This has shifted defense priorities toward cheap, mass-producible, "attritable" systems. This fundamental change in product and economics creates a massive opportunity for startups to innovate outside the traditional defense prime model.
The nearly trillion-dollar US defense budget is misleading. The vast majority is locked into fixed costs like salaries, facilities, and sustaining legacy systems. The actual procurement budget for new technology is at a historic low as a percentage of GDP, constraining modernization.
A singular, massive cash infusion into the defense budget encourages buying more of today's systems, filling order books for weapons with built-in obsolescence. This approach creates a short-term 'sugar high' but fails to fund the adaptive industrial infrastructure needed for future conflicts, ultimately leading to a less capable force.
Strategic military planning, which looks decades into the future, is still based on a 2% inflation target. This is a critical flaw, as even slightly higher sustained inflation will drastically cut the real budget, severely limiting the military's ability to procure equipment and maintain readiness.
Unlike most technologies that become cheaper over time, developing a new jet engine has grown more expensive, even on an inflation-adjusted basis, with new programs costing over $10 billion. This is because engines constantly push the frontiers of material science and engineering, keeping R&D costs and barriers to entry extraordinarily high.
The US Navy is shrinking despite stated goals to expand against threats like China, largely due to congressional budget dysfunction. "Continuing resolutions" prevent new ship starts and lead to billions in waste, while the Pentagon as a whole fails to spend about $15 billion annually, money which eventually evaporates.
Building hardware compliant with US defense standards (NDAA) presents a major cost hurdle. Marine robotics company CSATS notes that switching from a mass-produced Chinese component to a US-made alternative can increase the price by 8x to 15x, a significant economic challenge for re-shoring manufacturing.
Markets can forgive a one-time bad investment. The critical danger for companies heavily investing in AI infrastructure is not the initial cash burn, but creating ongoing liabilities and operational costs. This financial "drag" could permanently lower future profitability, creating a structural problem that can't be easily unwound or written off.
The defense procurement system was built when technology platforms lasted for decades, prioritizing getting it perfect over getting it fast. This risk-averse model is now a liability in an era of rapid innovation, as it stifles the experimentation and failure necessary for speed.
The perception of the defense budget as a massive fund for new technology is incorrect. More than half is allocated to fixed costs like personnel, facilities, and maintaining old equipment. The actual procurement budget for new systems is historically low as a percentage of GDP.