A singular, massive cash infusion into the defense budget encourages buying more of today's systems, filling order books for weapons with built-in obsolescence. This approach creates a short-term 'sugar high' but fails to fund the adaptive industrial infrastructure needed for future conflicts, ultimately leading to a less capable force.
The Ukrainian conflict demonstrates the power of a fast, iterative cycle: deploy technology, see if it works, and adapt quickly. This agile approach, common in startups but alien to traditional defense, is essential for the U.S. to maintain its technological edge and avoid being outpaced.
The nearly trillion-dollar US defense budget is misleading. The vast majority is locked into fixed costs like salaries, facilities, and sustaining legacy systems. The actual procurement budget for new technology is at a historic low as a percentage of GDP, constraining modernization.
When purchasing a new ship or aircraft, the initial price tag is deceptive. The 'fully burdened cost' includes long-term expenses for crewing, training, support, and maintenance. A one-time budget increase doesn't cover this tail, forcing the military to retire platforms early and resulting in no net growth of the force.
The defense procurement system was built when technology platforms lasted for decades, prioritizing getting it perfect over getting it fast. This risk-averse model is now a liability in an era of rapid innovation, as it stifles the experimentation and failure necessary for speed.
The decisive advantage in future conflicts will not be just technological superiority, but the ability to mass-produce weapons efficiently. After decades of offshoring manufacturing, re-industrializing the US to produce hardware at scale is Anduril's core strategic focus, viewing the factory itself as the ultimate weapon.
The U.S. military's power is no longer backed by a robust domestic industrial base. Decades of offshoring have made it dependent on rivals like China for critical minerals and manufacturing. This means the country can no longer sustain a prolonged conflict, a reality its defense planners ignore.
Simulations of a conflict with China consistently show the US depleting its high-end munitions in about seven days. The industrial base then requires two to three years to replenish these stockpiles, revealing a massive gap between military strategy and production capacity that undermines deterrence.
Anduril's co-founder argues America's atrophied manufacturing base is a critical national security vulnerability. The ultimate strategic advantage isn't a single advanced weapon, but the ability to mass-produce "tens of thousands of things" efficiently. Re-industrializing is therefore a core pillar of modern defense strategy.
The US military's 30-year strategy, born from the Gulf War, of relying on small numbers of technologically superior weapons is flawed. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that protracted, industrial-scale conflicts are won by mass and production volume, not just technological sophistication.
The perception of the defense budget as a massive fund for new technology is incorrect. More than half is allocated to fixed costs like personnel, facilities, and maintaining old equipment. The actual procurement budget for new systems is historically low as a percentage of GDP.