Decades of adding regulations without subtracting have made the current defense procurement framework unsalvageable through minor adjustments. To achieve necessary speed and efficiency, policymakers must abandon the current system and start fresh, focusing on outcome-based contracts rather than process compliance.

Frank Kendall argues that criticism of defense primes is misplaced. The defense industrial base builds what its customer, the Department of Defense, asks for. To get cheaper, simpler, and more innovative products, the services must change their requirements and demand them. The problem lies with the customer, not the supplier.

The government's procurement process often defaults to bidding out projects to established players like Lockheed Martin, even if a startup presents a breakthrough. Success requires navigating this bureaucratic reality, not just superior engineering.

The problem with large defense contractors isn't the companies themselves but an acquisition system that awards contracts before a product is built. This shifts all development risk to the government. The solution is to force companies to invest their own risk capital first.

The Navy realized its biggest obstacle to adopting new technology was its own internal processes. To fix this, they focused inward, creating bootcamps to retrain program and contracting officers on how to work with commercial companies, cutting acquisition timelines from 18 to 3 months.

Today's cumbersome defense acquisition system was designed to solve the 1980s problem of fraud, like overpriced screwdrivers. While successful at preventing that "Type 1 error," it created a massive "Type 2 error": an inability to procure technology at a relevant speed.

The defense procurement system was built when technology platforms lasted for decades, prioritizing getting it perfect over getting it fast. This risk-averse model is now a liability in an era of rapid innovation, as it stifles the experimentation and failure necessary for speed.

Policies to modernize the US Defense Industrial Base by integrating commercial tech already exist on paper. The primary obstacle is implementation, which faces strong resistance from established prime contractors and entrenched political and budgetary practices that favor the concentrated status quo.

Under Secretary of War Emil Michael states the biggest barrier for defense startups isn't technology, but navigating procurement bureaucracy. By reforming requirements and shifting to commercial-style, fixed-cost contracts, the Pentagon aims to favor product innovation over process navigation.