Frank Kendall argues that criticism of defense primes is misplaced. The defense industrial base builds what its customer, the Department of Defense, asks for. To get cheaper, simpler, and more innovative products, the services must change their requirements and demand them. The problem lies with the customer, not the supplier.
Congressional appropriators hate program changes or cancellations because it forces them to admit to their constituents that a previously funded project failed. This political pressure creates powerful inertia, forcing the military to continue with suboptimal programs and preventing agile shifts in resource allocation.
Former SECAF Frank Kendall warns that conflicts against less advanced adversaries like Iran reinforce outdated tactics and supply chains. This diverts focus and resources from developing the adaptive capabilities needed to counter a peer competitor like China, which presents a fundamentally different challenge.
Innovation initiatives from entities like the DIU or OSD are destined to fail unless a military service champions the technology and integrates it into its budget. Services have enduring priorities and will not fund external projects long-term, regardless of top-down pressure. You must bring them along culturally.
Well-intentioned ethics rules have created a culture of fear, making government officials hesitant to engage in open dialogue with industry experts. This stifles the rapid, collaborative problem-solving that was crucial during the Cold War, slowing down innovation and preventing the best ideas from emerging quickly.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), designed to foster joint capabilities, often devolves into a forum where services defend their own programs. Instead of finding the best overall solution, members ensure nothing bad happens to their service's budget, leading to rubber-stamped requirements and bureaucratic bloat.
A reform-minded leader can create ad-hoc teams and force collaboration between operators and technologists. However, these changes are often temporary. Once the leader departs, the military's established cultural norms and organizational structures, like powerful four-star commands, tend to reassert themselves, erasing the progress.
The US cannot win a manufacturing-based war of attrition against China. Instead of stockpiling existing weapons, the focus must shift to creating a defense industrial base that can rapidly adapt and circumvent new threats. This requires smart, targeted investments in flexible capabilities rather than sheer volume.
Frank Kendall was shocked to find that major decisions on new military programs were often made "by the seat of our pants" based on a four-star general's preference. This lack of rigorous, data-driven operational analysis leads to suboptimal investments and wasted billions, a problem he tried to fix by elevating the analysis organization.