With the main war against Iran ending on disadvantageous terms for Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu is prolonging the conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon. This allows him to project a "fighting spirit" to his electorate ahead of an election, turning a secondary front into a primary stage for political posturing.

The October 7th attacks, intended to advance the Palestinian cause, were a catastrophic strategic error. They eliminated previous restraints on Israel, allowing it to unleash its full military capacity as the region's superpower, ultimately leading to the decimation of Hamas, Hezbollah, and their primary sponsor, Iran.

Israel's initial war plan was a targeted campaign against Iran's ballistic missile project. The conflict escalated into a broader, less attainable mission of regime change after the Trump administration joined, demonstrating how a powerful ally's involvement can lead to strategic "mission creep."

Hezbollah maintained popular support by providing extensive social services, acting as a "state within a state." However, this social contract has weakened due to financing problems from its patron, Iran. This has eroded its domestic support base even before the latest conflict escalated, making it more vulnerable.

Targeting senior leaders in regimes that operate on an irregular warfare model is a flawed strategy. These governments anticipate such attacks and have shadow leadership structures in place, ensuring operational continuity and rendering decapitation strikes futile.

Initial military actions, like successful bombings, can feel like victories. However, they often fail to solve the core political issue, trapping leaders into escalating the conflict further to achieve the original strategic goal, as they don't want to accept failure.

The hope that airstrikes can catalyze a popular uprising for regime change is historically unfounded. Unlike in Afghanistan or Libya where local ground forces existed, there is no organized army on the ground in Iran to capitalize on air power, making a decapitation strategy highly unlikely to succeed.

Hezbollah's involvement in the conflict is not a strategic choice but an obligation to its patron, Iran. This puts the group in a perilous position, as another war with Israel is deeply unpopular in Lebanon and comes when Hezbollah is still weakened from a previous conflict and would prefer to be rebuilding its forces.

Historically, confronting Hezbollah was a dangerous taboo in Lebanese politics. Now, facing a potential Israeli invasion, the government has explicitly stated its aim to disarm the group, representing a significant shift in the Overton window of what is politically discussable and possible.