Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) isn't funded by the state budget. It operates a global network of front companies for construction and other projects, laundering money to create a self-sustaining financial ecosystem. If the regime collapses, the IRGC would likely persist as a heavily-armed mafia with international criminal ties.

Meaningful reform in Iran is unlikely until the succession of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader is resolved. Deep uncertainty over who will hold power paralyzes the political system, preventing any faction from making significant changes and forcing the country into a holding pattern until the leadership transition occurs.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has eclipsed the clergy, controlling major political and economic institutions. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains power through a symbiotic relationship with the IRGC, leveraging their military and economic might, rather than just religious authority.

Iran is at a critical inflection point as its aging and ill Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has no clear successor. The constitutional requirements for the role were tailored specifically for his predecessor, Khomeini. With no one in the wings who meets the criteria, the country faces significant instability upon his death.

Young Iranians, with no memory of the Shah's era, embrace a romanticized vision of pre-1979 Iran's social freedoms and global standing. This nostalgia, combined with the regime's suppression of internal leaders, has elevated Reza Pahlavi as a symbolic, default leader for a nationalist reclamation.

The ruling elite has inverted from 80% ideologues at the revolution's start to 80% charlatans today. Expedience and financial gain, not revolutionary zeal, now bind the regime's core. This ideological hollowness makes the regime more brittle than its rhetoric suggests.

Reza Pahlavi's strategy is not based on domestic uprising alone. He believes protestors are "sacrificial lambs" who cannot succeed without direct American military intervention, framing them as a "fort waiting for the cavalry." This dependence makes his plan vulnerable to US political shifts.

The Iranian populace is exhausted with theocratic rule after five decades. Any future authoritarian leader will likely be a product of the intelligence or security services, appealing to nationalism rather than revolutionary ideology. The era of the turban-wearing ruler is over.

Dara Khosrowshahi theorizes the Shah of Iran's regime collapsed because he modernized too fast, focused excessively on military power over industrial growth, and failed to bring along rural populations and integrate Islam into his vision, creating a power vacuum for the Islamic regime to exploit.