The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has eclipsed the clergy, controlling major political and economic institutions. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains power through a symbiotic relationship with the IRGC, leveraging their military and economic might, rather than just religious authority.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) isn't funded by the state budget. It operates a global network of front companies for construction and other projects, laundering money to create a self-sustaining financial ecosystem. If the regime collapses, the IRGC would likely persist as a heavily-armed mafia with international criminal ties.
The US raid to capture Venezuela's president has sparked talk within Iran's elite about a similar "solution": removing Supreme Leader Khamenei to appease protestors and preserve the system, rather than allowing it to collapse entirely under external and internal pressure.
Meaningful reform in Iran is unlikely until the succession of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader is resolved. Deep uncertainty over who will hold power paralyzes the political system, preventing any faction from making significant changes and forcing the country into a holding pattern until the leadership transition occurs.
Iran is at a critical inflection point as its aging and ill Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has no clear successor. The constitutional requirements for the role were tailored specifically for his predecessor, Khomeini. With no one in the wings who meets the criteria, the country faces significant instability upon his death.
The ruling elite has inverted from 80% ideologues at the revolution's start to 80% charlatans today. Expedience and financial gain, not revolutionary zeal, now bind the regime's core. This ideological hollowness makes the regime more brittle than its rhetoric suggests.
The Iranian populace is exhausted with theocratic rule after five decades. Any future authoritarian leader will likely be a product of the intelligence or security services, appealing to nationalism rather than revolutionary ideology. The era of the turban-wearing ruler is over.
Ayatollah Khamenei believes that any attempt at reform, like Gorbachev's in the USSR, would accelerate the regime's collapse rather than prolong it. This formative experience informs his rigid refusal to cede ground on core principles like the mandatory hijab, ensuring a brutal response to dissent.
Dara Khosrowshahi theorizes the Shah of Iran's regime collapsed because he modernized too fast, focused excessively on military power over industrial growth, and failed to bring along rural populations and integrate Islam into his vision, creating a power vacuum for the Islamic regime to exploit.
While US sanctions are a factor, the Iranian currency's freefall is largely due to structural corruption. The economy is dominated by the military and clerical foundations, a political-economic model that stifles growth and fuels public anger—a problem sanctions relief alone cannot solve.
Unlike nascent revolutionary states that rally against foreign attacks, late-stage dictatorships are weakened by military defeats. Iran's recent humiliations by Israel and the US have exposed incompetence and eroded the public's perception of strength, fueling protests and accelerating the regime's demise.