To bring conflicts to a diplomatic resolution, the U.S. has historically needed to apply pressure on its own allies to moderate their objectives by signaling limits to material support, a tactic seen with both South Korea and Israel.

The greatest risk of nuclear weapon use is not a peacetime accident but a nation facing catastrophic defeat in a conventional war. The pressure to escalate becomes immense when a country's conventional forces are being eradicated, as it may see nuclear use as its only path to survival.

China's showcase of advanced military hardware, like its new aircraft carrier, is primarily a psychological tool. The strategy is to build a military so 'forbiddingly huge' that the US would hesitate to engage, allowing China to achieve goals like reabsorbing Taiwan without fighting. This suggests their focus is on perceived power to deter intervention.

Because North Korea has pre-delegated nuclear launch authority and a "use or lose" posture, a minor conventional incident like a drone incursion could trigger a rapid, uncontrolled escalation spiral. This creates a terrifyingly plausible scenario for accidental nuclear war.

Deterrence happens in the mind of the enemy. The US fails to deter Iran by attacking its Arab proxies because Iranian culture views Arabs as expendable. To be effective, deterrence must threaten what the target culture actually values. In Iran's case, this means threatening Persians, not their proxies.

Focusing solely on deterring a military invasion of Taiwan is insufficient. The US must develop capabilities to counter China's gray zone tactics and manage the economic fallout of a crisis. Failure to do so could lead to a US concession and a Chinese victory without a shot being fired.

The primary function of missile defense is not to achieve victory but to prevent a rapid defeat by thwarting initial attacks. This buys crucial time for offensive forces to neutralize threats by other means. While its absence can lose a war quickly, its presence alone is not a winning strategy.

Ukraine should aim to become the 'South Korea' of Europe. This means accepting a negotiated peace or armistice that secures its independence and sovereignty over most of its territory, even if it doesn't reclaim everything. It can then rebuild into a prosperous democracy, creating a stark contrast with a decaying Russia.

Unlike China's historical "minimal deterrence" (surviving a first strike to retaliate), the US and Russia operate on "damage limitation"—using nukes to destroy the enemy's arsenal. This logic inherently drives a numbers game, fueling an arms race as each side seeks to counter the other's growing stockpile.