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Robinson says South Korea built competitive shipbuilding from scratch, so the U.S. could too, but it requires strategy and seriousness. Asked about government stakes and corruption, he points to accountability in contract allocation, noting Korea sustained growth after democratic transition. He says institutions should govern the process.

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Industrial strategy is more effective when focused on solving big problems, like creating healthy school lunches or landing on the moon. This "mission-oriented" approach stimulates innovation across many sectors, unlike traditional policy that just hands subsidies to favored industries.

Contrary to popular belief, the success of semiconductor industries in Taiwan and Korea isn't primarily due to massive government subsidies. Instead, their governments excel at creating an extremely stable and predictable business environment with streamlined permitting and minimal regulatory friction, which is more critical for long-term, capital-intensive projects.

Effective US industrial policy should foster competition among states rather than imposing top-down federal plans. By offering federal loans with equity kickers to states that opt-in to host critical industries like mining or chip fabs, the government can incentivize reshoring while allowing for a market-driven, locally-supported approach.

Current US policy is reactive, fixing compromised supply chains like semiconductors. A proactive 'offensive' strategy would identify nascent, critical industries (e.g., humanoid robotics) and build the entire supply chain domestically from the start, securing a long-term economic and national security advantage.

A U.S. national security document's phrase, "the future belongs to makers," signals a significant policy shift. Credit and tax incentives will likely be redirected from financial engineering (e.g., leveraged buyouts in private equity) to tangible industrial production in order to build resilient, non-Chinese supply chains.

A complete national industrial strategy requires a dual approach. It needs large, congressionally-approved programs for trillion-dollar sectors like semiconductors, paired with a smaller, more flexible fund to quickly address emerging choke points in smaller markets like rare earths or APIs without new legislation each time.

Government intervention is most effective when targeting industries that meet three criteria: they must be critical to national security or the economy, compromised by foreign dependence or choke points, and fundamentally changeable through targeted financial incentives that can shift their long-term economics.

To rebuild its industrial base at speed, the US government must abandon its typical strategy of funding many small players. Instead, it should identify and place huge bets on a handful of trusted, patriotic entrepreneurs, giving them the scale, offtake agreements, and backing necessary to compete globally.

The "invisible hand" of the market has led to the hollowing out of America's industrial base. The US should learn from China's focus on production and scale, adapting tools like public investment to crowd in private capital for frontier industries, rather than fully copying China's state-directed model.

The key bottleneck in US shipbuilding is administrative, not industrial. US shipyards take four times longer than Chinese counterparts to move from contract to keel-laying. Once construction begins, their build times are comparable. The front-end delay stems from perverse incentives to prolong backlogs.

Industrial policy needs planning and accountability, not just subsidies | RiffOn