To counter the economic threat from China's state-directed capitalism, the U.S. is ironically being forced to adopt similar strategies. This involves greater government intervention in capital allocation and industrial policy, representing a convergence of economic models rather than a clear victory for free-market capitalism.

Current US policy is reactive, fixing compromised supply chains like semiconductors. A proactive 'offensive' strategy would identify nascent, critical industries (e.g., humanoid robotics) and build the entire supply chain domestically from the start, securing a long-term economic and national security advantage.

It's naive to expect private companies to reverse the offshoring of chip manufacturing, a trend they initiated to maximize profits. Pat Gelsinger argues that markets don't price in long-term geopolitical risk, making substantial, long-term government industrial policy essential to bring supply chains back.

A U.S. national security document's phrase, "the future belongs to makers," signals a significant policy shift. Credit and tax incentives will likely be redirected from financial engineering (e.g., leveraged buyouts in private equity) to tangible industrial production in order to build resilient, non-Chinese supply chains.

China achieved tech superpower status not through invention, but by mastering mass manufacturing and process knowledge. It allows the U.S. to create the initial spark (0-to-1), like solar PV, and then China creates the "prairie fire" by scaling it (1-to-N), ultimately dominating the industry.

The US cannot win a manufacturing-based war of attrition against China. Instead of stockpiling existing weapons, the focus must shift to creating a defense industrial base that can rapidly adapt and circumvent new threats. This requires smart, targeted investments in flexible capabilities rather than sheer volume.

China prioritizes industrial growth and physical manufacturing (an engineering mindset), while America focuses on software valuations and financial engineering (a lawyerly mindset). This fundamental difference explains China's rapid dominance in cars, solar, ships, and advanced manufacturing.

A complete national industrial strategy requires a dual approach. It needs large, congressionally-approved programs for trillion-dollar sectors like semiconductors, paired with a smaller, more flexible fund to quickly address emerging choke points in smaller markets like rare earths or APIs without new legislation each time.

To rebuild its industrial base at speed, the US government must abandon its typical strategy of funding many small players. Instead, it should identify and place huge bets on a handful of trusted, patriotic entrepreneurs, giving them the scale, offtake agreements, and backing necessary to compete globally.