While simple, tax credits are a passive tool. Discretionary funding grants, like those in the CHIPS Act, allow government agencies to actively negotiate for specific strategic outcomes, such as compelling a company to build an extra fab or onshore a critical technology that a tax credit alone would not incentivize.

Current US policy is reactive, fixing compromised supply chains like semiconductors. A proactive 'offensive' strategy would identify nascent, critical industries (e.g., humanoid robotics) and build the entire supply chain domestically from the start, securing a long-term economic and national security advantage.

It's naive to expect private companies to reverse the offshoring of chip manufacturing, a trend they initiated to maximize profits. Pat Gelsinger argues that markets don't price in long-term geopolitical risk, making substantial, long-term government industrial policy essential to bring supply chains back.

For manufacturing startups, factory location is a critical strategic decision. They should prioritize states where local governments actively partner with them to expedite permits, guarantee power, and assist with hiring, avoiding regulatory bottlenecks found elsewhere.

A U.S. national security document's phrase, "the future belongs to makers," signals a significant policy shift. Credit and tax incentives will likely be redirected from financial engineering (e.g., leveraged buyouts in private equity) to tangible industrial production in order to build resilient, non-Chinese supply chains.

Unlike the U.S. government's recent strategy of backing single "champions" like Intel, China's successful industrial policy in sectors like EVs involves funding numerous competing companies. This state-fostered domestic competition is a key driver of their rapid innovation and market dominance.

A complete national industrial strategy requires a dual approach. It needs large, congressionally-approved programs for trillion-dollar sectors like semiconductors, paired with a smaller, more flexible fund to quickly address emerging choke points in smaller markets like rare earths or APIs without new legislation each time.

Government intervention is most effective when targeting industries that meet three criteria: they must be critical to national security or the economy, compromised by foreign dependence or choke points, and fundamentally changeable through targeted financial incentives that can shift their long-term economics.

China's government designates strategic industries, and provinces subsidize local firms to become national champions. This hyper-competition, while creating overcapacity and unprofitability, forces surviving companies to become technologically superior and globally competitive. The state then helps the winners consolidate and scale.