Onshoring is not possible by replicating China's labor-intensive model, making autonomous robots a necessity. Simultaneously, the strategic, dual-use nature of this technology makes it imperative to develop these robots domestically. This creates a powerful feedback loop where the technology enables onshoring while the need for the technology drives it.

The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.

A U.S. national security document's phrase, "the future belongs to makers," signals a significant policy shift. Credit and tax incentives will likely be redirected from financial engineering (e.g., leveraged buyouts in private equity) to tangible industrial production in order to build resilient, non-Chinese supply chains.

The push to build defense systems in America reveals that critical sub-components, like rocket motors or high-powered amplifiers, are no longer manufactured domestically at scale. This forces new defense companies to vertically integrate and build their own factories, essentially rebuilding parts of the industrial base themselves.

Instead of trying to reclaim low-cost assembly jobs, the U.S. should leapfrog to advanced manufacturing for complex future products like robots and electric vehicles. This strategy creates a new category of higher-skill, higher-paying "blue collar plus" jobs that are more resilient to offshoring.

The Under Secretary of War defines the current "1938 moment" not as an imminent war, but as a critical juncture for rebuilding the domestic industrial base. The focus is on reversing decades of outsourcing critical components like minerals and pharmaceuticals, which created strategic vulnerabilities now deemed unacceptable for national security.

A complete national industrial strategy requires a dual approach. It needs large, congressionally-approved programs for trillion-dollar sectors like semiconductors, paired with a smaller, more flexible fund to quickly address emerging choke points in smaller markets like rare earths or APIs without new legislation each time.

Government intervention is most effective when targeting industries that meet three criteria: they must be critical to national security or the economy, compromised by foreign dependence or choke points, and fundamentally changeable through targeted financial incentives that can shift their long-term economics.

To rebuild its industrial base at speed, the US government must abandon its typical strategy of funding many small players. Instead, it should identify and place huge bets on a handful of trusted, patriotic entrepreneurs, giving them the scale, offtake agreements, and backing necessary to compete globally.