The first draft of the CHIPS Program Office's guiding "Vision for Success" paper was a historical analysis of how the U.S. lost its semiconductor manufacturing edge. This diagnostic approach was replaced with a forward-looking, target-setting document to be more practical and less academic for stakeholders.
The CHIPS program office developed an internal "4Cs" framework to systematically evaluate funding applications. This model assessed projects based on manufacturing volume (Capacity), technological know-how (Capability), market dynamics (Competition), and importance to end-use markets (Criticality), ensuring consistent and fair decision-making.
While the fabless semiconductor model is blamed for the U.S. losing manufacturing, it was a crucial enabler for innovation. It allowed design-focused companies like Apple, NVIDIA, and Qualcomm to de-risk manufacturing and focus on creating new technologies, highlighting a key tradeoff between industrial base and innovation velocity.
True economic security isn't just about production capacity; it's about having the "capability"—the qualified know-how and processes. This drastically shortens the 2-3 year time-to-recovery after a supply chain disruption, as qualifying a new fab for a specific product is the most time-consuming step.
Demonstrating a collaborative approach to "friend-shoring," some allied governments actively asked the U.S. CHIPS Program Office to refer semiconductor projects that were considered but ultimately not funded. These countries were eager to use their own subsidies to attract manufacturing capacity that the U.S. couldn't accommodate.
Contrary to typical competitive behavior, major memory chip manufacturers intentionally limit their market share with any single customer. They prefer their clients, like Dell, to be multi-sourced from their competitors. This ensures a more resilient and stable supply chain for the entire ecosystem, prioritizing long-term stability over short-term dominance.
In economic warfare, controlling an intermediate good like a microcontroller is more powerful than controlling a finished product like a car. Because intermediate goods are inputs to many different supply chains, disrupting their flow causes far broader and more cascading damage to an adversary's economy, creating greater geopolitical leverage.
Contrary to popular belief, the success of semiconductor industries in Taiwan and Korea isn't primarily due to massive government subsidies. Instead, their governments excel at creating an extremely stable and predictable business environment with streamlined permitting and minimal regulatory friction, which is more critical for long-term, capital-intensive projects.
The CHIPS Act deliberately de-emphasized funding for critical materials. This was a pragmatic choice driven by tax law: material processing projects don't qualify for the 25% investment tax credit that fabs get. Covering this gap with direct grants would have been too costly for the program's limited budget.
A zero-tolerance policy on selling advanced AI chips to China might be strategically shortsighted. Allowing some sales could build a degree of dependence within China's ecosystem. This dependence then becomes a powerful point of leverage that the U.S. could exploit in a future crisis, a weapon it wouldn't have if China were forced into total self-sufficiency from the start.