A complete national industrial strategy requires a dual approach. It needs large, congressionally-approved programs for trillion-dollar sectors like semiconductors, paired with a smaller, more flexible fund to quickly address emerging choke points in smaller markets like rare earths or APIs without new legislation each time.

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Current US policy is reactive, fixing compromised supply chains like semiconductors. A proactive 'offensive' strategy would identify nascent, critical industries (e.g., humanoid robotics) and build the entire supply chain domestically from the start, securing a long-term economic and national security advantage.

The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.

China's export ban on rare earth metals, critical for everything from iPhones to fighter jets, exposes a major US vulnerability. The solution is to treat domestic mining like vaccine development—a national security priority that requires fast-tracking the typical 30-year regulatory process for opening new mines.

A U.S. national security document's phrase, "the future belongs to makers," signals a significant policy shift. Credit and tax incentives will likely be redirected from financial engineering (e.g., leveraged buyouts in private equity) to tangible industrial production in order to build resilient, non-Chinese supply chains.

To solve national security gaps without permanent state control, create a single, specialized, and temporary capital fund. It would be politically shielded, operate with a clear mandate to fill critical private sector gaps, and have a built-in expiration date to prevent it from becoming a permanent bureaucracy.

The current conception of the defense industrial base focuses on large primes like L3 and General Atomics. However, 98% of US manufacturing is done by small businesses that are not integrated into the defense supply chain. A key investment would be creating a pathway to bring these smaller, agile companies into the fold.

To combat China's ability to dump products and destabilize markets, the US government should act as a buyer of last resort for critical materials like rare earths. This would create a strategic reserve, similar to the petroleum reserve, ensuring price stability for domestic investment and manufacturing.

Attempting to out-mine, out-process, and out-spend China in traditional rare earth production is a losing strategy. The U.S. can gain an advantage by investing in breakthrough technologies that bypass China's existing chokehold on the supply chain.

Government intervention is most effective when targeting industries that meet three criteria: they must be critical to national security or the economy, compromised by foreign dependence or choke points, and fundamentally changeable through targeted financial incentives that can shift their long-term economics.

To rebuild its industrial base at speed, the US government must abandon its typical strategy of funding many small players. Instead, it should identify and place huge bets on a handful of trusted, patriotic entrepreneurs, giving them the scale, offtake agreements, and backing necessary to compete globally.