The blanket assumption that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are poor capital allocators is flawed. Investment success depends on the price paid for the risk, not on avoiding SOEs entirely. Some SOEs are effective capital allocators, while many private companies are not, making a case-by-case analysis essential.
For D1 Capital, the primary risk in China isn't economic but political. The government's ability to arbitrarily influence resource allocation, punish successful companies, and eliminate entire sectors without due process creates an unacceptable level of uncertainty for capital allocators, regardless of how cheap valuations become.
Contrary to popular belief, the success of semiconductor industries in Taiwan and Korea isn't primarily due to massive government subsidies. Instead, their governments excel at creating an extremely stable and predictable business environment with streamlined permitting and minimal regulatory friction, which is more critical for long-term, capital-intensive projects.
Beyond screening countries for freedom, the Freedom 100 EM Index also excludes all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the security level. This double-layered approach reinforces its core philosophy of avoiding government interference in markets, applying the principle from top-down allocation to bottom-up stock selection.
China's economic success is driven by a small, hyper-competitive private sector (the top 5%). This masks a much larger, dysfunctional morass of state-owned enterprises, leading to declining overall capital productivity despite headline-grabbing advances.
During periods of country-specific fear or uncertainty, investors sell off all assets indiscriminately. High-quality companies are discarded along with low-quality ones, making country-level risk analysis more critical for investors than sector or individual company analysis.
Unlike typical sovereign funds that manage reserves, Temasek directly owns its assets. This structure necessitates actively selling assets ("recycling capital") to fund new investments, creating a disciplined trade-off between holding long-term winners and pursuing new opportunities.
China's economic structure, which funnels state-backed capital into sectors like EVs, inherently creates overinvestment and excess capacity. This distorted cost of capital leads to hyper-competitive industries, making it difficult for even successful companies to generate predictable, growing returns for shareholders.
Western investors are unskilled in navigating environments where governments actively manipulate savings and capital allocation. Portfolio managers from emerging markets like Brazil and South Africa, where financial repression is the norm, possess the necessary experience to thrive.
When investing in markets with potential governance hurdles, like regional Japan, the "deep value" principle is key. Purchasing assets at a fraction of book value creates a margin of safety. Even if activism takes longer or yields less, the low entry price can still generate an acceptable return while risking no capital.
In authoritarian regimes like China, companies must prioritize state interests over shareholder value. Perth Toll argues this means foreign investors are not just taking on risk, but are actively subsidizing the cost of a company's compliance with a government agenda that may oppose their own financial goals.