Historically, Russia and China's strategy as continental empires involves avoiding two-front wars and actively destabilizing neighboring states. This creates buffer zones and prevents any single power from becoming a threat on their borders, ensuring their own security through regional instability.

China's renewed commitment to the previously stalled Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline is a direct geopolitical response to the U.S. using trade and energy as weapons. This move signals a strategic pivot to reduce its energy dependency on the Western Hemisphere amid escalating trade tensions.

According to the Bank of Finland's governor, China's backing of Russia's aggression has fundamentally altered European perceptions. Europeans now view China as an ally of a nation actively trying to undermine their freedoms, creating a significant obstacle to deeper economic and political ties.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border war led China to view the USSR as its primary adversary. By aligning with the U.S., China forced the Soviets to heavily militarize a second massive border, fatally overextending an economy already competing with NATO in Europe.

Both nations use nationalism to rally support and distract from domestic failings. But this approach is a "heady drink" with severe downsides: it repels internal minorities, pushes neighbors to form counter-alliances, and makes it politically difficult to de-escalate international crises.

The core national anxieties of Russia and China are opposites, shaping their strategic cultures. Russia's history of devastating invasions fuels its fear of external threats (the "Mongol yoke"). China, haunted by centuries of civil war, fears internal chaos and the collapse of the state above all else.

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia consistently manipulated China during its moments of weakness. It offered "mediation" in conflicts like the Opium Wars that ultimately served Russian interests by keeping China destabilized and forcing it to cede territory.

China embraces economic globalization, crediting it for lifting 800 million from poverty. However, it explicitly rejects the "militarized globalization" represented by security pacts like AUKUS or NATO expansion. This differentiates its approach from the Western model, which often intertwines economic integration with shared security and political values.

Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.