Both nations use nationalism to rally support and distract from domestic failings. But this approach is a "heady drink" with severe downsides: it repels internal minorities, pushes neighbors to form counter-alliances, and makes it politically difficult to de-escalate international crises.
Russia portrays NATO's growth as an aggressive act of encirclement. This narrative, however, ignores that Eastern European nations eagerly joined NATO for protection, driven by Russia's long and brutal history of posing an existential threat to its neighbors. The expansion was defensive, not offensive.
Observing the USSR's fall, the Chinese Communist Party drew key lessons to ensure its survival: use overwhelming force against dissent, prioritize the Party's power monopoly even at the cost of economic efficiency, and aggressively assimilate ethnic minorities to prevent separatism.
Historically, Russia and China's strategy as continental empires involves avoiding two-front wars and actively destabilizing neighboring states. This creates buffer zones and prevents any single power from becoming a threat on their borders, ensuring their own security through regional instability.
The anxiety driving protectionism in the West stems from seeing other nations catch up, not from an absolute decline in living standards. This psychological fear of losing the top spot undermines national confidence and can trigger a dangerous, self-defeating shift toward isolationism.
According to the Bank of Finland's governor, China's backing of Russia's aggression has fundamentally altered European perceptions. Europeans now view China as an ally of a nation actively trying to undermine their freedoms, creating a significant obstacle to deeper economic and political ties.
China's immense state capacity allows for rapid infrastructure development but also enables disastrous national policies like the one-child policy or Zero-COVID. Unlike the deliberative U.S. system, China's efficiency means that when it goes off track, it can go catastrophically off track before any course correction is possible.
The core national anxieties of Russia and China are opposites, shaping their strategic cultures. Russia's history of devastating invasions fuels its fear of external threats (the "Mongol yoke"). China, haunted by centuries of civil war, fears internal chaos and the collapse of the state above all else.
Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.
An obsessive focus on internal political battles creates a critical geopolitical vulnerability. While a nation tears itself apart with divisive rhetoric, strategic adversaries like China benefit from the distraction and internal weakening. This domestic infighting accelerates the erosion of the nation's global influence and power.
The psychological engine of populism is the zero-sum fallacy. It frames every issue—trade deficits, immigration, university admissions—as a win-lose scenario. This narrative, where one group's success must come at another's expense, fosters the protectionist and resentful attitudes that populist leaders exploit.