China embraces economic globalization, crediting it for lifting 800 million from poverty. However, it explicitly rejects the "militarized globalization" represented by security pacts like AUKUS or NATO expansion. This differentiates its approach from the Western model, which often intertwines economic integration with shared security and political values.

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The concept of 'weaponized interdependence,' highlighted by China's use of export controls, is driving Asian nations like Japan, India, and South Korea to implement economic security acts. This shifts investment toward domestic supply chains in critical minerals, semiconductors, and defense, creating state-backed opportunities.

China's economic ascent began when Deng Xiaoping invited American experts to teach them about capitalism. This strategy, combined with becoming the world's manufacturing hub, allowed them to learn the system, grow strong quietly, and eventually become a dominant global power.

Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, which ignited China’s growth, were based on adopting American free-market principles like private enterprise and foreign capital. China’s success stemmed from decentralizing its economy, the very system the U.S. is now tempted to abandon for a more centralized model.

Unlike the Soviet Union's missionary zeal to spread communism, China does not want other nations to become Chinese. Its worldview is centered on being the 'Middle Kingdom'—the sun which others orbit. It desires respect and a preeminent position, not to export its political system.

From a Chinese perspective, its vast manufacturing capacity, supported by world-class infrastructure, is a global utility. The concept of "Made in China" is reframed as "Made for the World." This view suggests the U.S. should focus on its own strengths like innovation ("zero to one") instead of viewing China's manufacturing prowess ("one to 100") as a national security threat.

The most significant point of friction for ordinary Chinese citizens is the constant U.S. military presence near its borders, such as naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait and bases in South Korea and Japan. This sense of being militarily encircled is a more potent source of public frustration than economic disputes.

The latest U.S. National Security Strategy drops confrontational rhetoric about China as an ideological threat, instead framing the relationship around economic rivalry and rebalancing. This shift prioritizes tangible deals over promoting American values globally, marking a departure from Reagan-era foreign policy.

While China supports institutions like the UN, its primary strategy for global influence is creating new, economically-focused organizations like the BRICS Bank and regional summits (e.g., China-Africa). This approach builds alternative power centers and economic interdependence with the Global South, supplementing rather than directly challenging the post-war Western order.

A multinational peacekeeping force from BRICS countries (China, India, Brazil, etc.) could be more effective in conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war. The rationale is that these nations are seen as more neutral than NATO and hold significant economic leverage (e.g., as major buyers of Russian energy), making them a credible guarantee against further aggression.

From 2001 onwards, while the U.S. was militarily and economically distracted by the War on Terror, China executed a long-term strategy. It focused on acquiring Western technology and building indigenous capabilities in AI, telecom, and robotics, effectively creating a rival global economic system.