Once Chinese intervention in the Korean War created a stalemate, Stalin saw the conflict as a perfect opportunity. He believed it would drain American resources and delay China's rise, all while keeping Russia out of direct conflict—a low-risk, high-reward strategy of "fighting to the last Chinese."

The U.S. Navy's ability to track Soviet submarines while keeping its own hidden threatened the USSR's second-strike capability, the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. This technological and financial asymmetry pushed the Soviets toward de-escalation and ultimately, ending the war.

The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.

Historically, Russia and China's strategy as continental empires involves avoiding two-front wars and actively destabilizing neighboring states. This creates buffer zones and prevents any single power from becoming a threat on their borders, ensuring their own security through regional instability.

China's economic ascent began when Deng Xiaoping invited American experts to teach them about capitalism. This strategy, combined with becoming the world's manufacturing hub, allowed them to learn the system, grow strong quietly, and eventually become a dominant global power.

The popular image of a strong, friendly Sino-Soviet bond originated with the 1919 Karahan Manifesto, where Bolsheviks promised to return lands seized by the Tsars. They later reneged on this promise, but the propaganda successfully masked Russia's own continued imperial ambitions in China.

The core national anxieties of Russia and China are opposites, shaping their strategic cultures. Russia's history of devastating invasions fuels its fear of external threats (the "Mongol yoke"). China, haunted by centuries of civil war, fears internal chaos and the collapse of the state above all else.

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia consistently manipulated China during its moments of weakness. It offered "mediation" in conflicts like the Opium Wars that ultimately served Russian interests by keeping China destabilized and forcing it to cede territory.

While Reagan's military buildup is credited with ending the Cold War, post-war data revealed the USSR was spending 40-70% of its GNP on defense—not the 20% the CIA estimated. This miscalculated overspending made economic collapse inevitable.