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The U.S. military is unparalleled in "decisive operations" (Phase 3) but consistently fails at long-term stabilization (Phase 4). To succeed, strategy should be reverse-engineered from the desired post-conflict state, rather than focusing solely on winning the initial battle.

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The US military action against Iran lacks a clear off-ramp or stated goal, violating the Powell Doctrine. This ambiguity between objectives like "regime change" and other aims creates strategic confusion and risks prolonged engagement without a defined victory condition.

Current military assessments focus on inputs like '6,000 targets struck,' creating a false sense of progress. This echoes the Vietnam War's body count metric, which measures activity but fails to assess actual strategic effects like achieving free navigation or eroding the enemy's power.

The policy of rotating commanders on one-year tours was a critical strategic flaw in Afghanistan. Each new commander arrived believing they had the "recipe for success" and would change the strategy, resulting in a series of disconnected, short-term plans that prevented long-term progress.

Despite advancements in AI, cyber, and air power, the fundamental nature of warfare remains unchanged. To defend, protect, and secure territory for civilization, a physical presence is non-negotiable. You cannot achieve enduring effects from a distance; you must put "young men in the dirt."

American military operations often begin with impressive displays of technological and operational excellence, much like a Bond film's opening scene. However, they frequently devolve into confusion and mediocrity due to a lack of coherent long-term strategy, leading to costly and disastrous outcomes.

The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.

Defining success as an ambitious, all-or-nothing outcome like 'regime change' is a critical mistake. Instead, administrations should set clear, measurable military objectives, such as degrading missile capabilities or naval threats. This allows them to define success, declare victory, and create a clear off-ramp for military campaigns.

Initial military actions, like successful bombings, can feel like victories. However, they often fail to solve the core political issue, trapping leaders into escalating the conflict further to achieve the original strategic goal, as they don't want to accept failure.

The US and Israel are operationally successful in degrading Iran's military capabilities. However, leadership has failed to articulate a coherent strategic objective for the war, making it difficult to define victory or know when the conflict will end.

The core weakness of U.S. foreign intervention isn't a lack of military or economic power, but a lack of seriousness about the aftermath. The U.S. lacks the patience, humility, and stamina for the difficult, unglamorous work of post-conflict planning and nation-building, dooming interventions to failure.

The U.S. Military Excels at Warfighting But Fails at Post-Conflict Stabilization | RiffOn