When David Swenson published the "Yale Model," many institutions tried to copy it without possessing Yale's resources, network, or manager selection expertise. This led many to chase private equity and hedge funds ill-equipped, resulting in them backing lower-quartile managers and achieving poor results.
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Fund managers are like zebras. Those in the middle (owning popular stocks) are safe from predators (getting fired), even if performance is mediocre. Those on the outside (owning unfamiliar stocks) find better grass (higher returns) but risk being the first ones eaten if an idea fails. This creates an institutional imperative to stay with the consensus.
There's a surprising disconnect between the perceived brilliance of individual investors at large, well-known private equity firms and their actual net-to-LP returns, which are often no better than the market median. This violates the assumption that top talent automatically generates outlier results.
When market competition compresses returns, PE firms that rigidly stick to historical IRR targets (e.g., 40%) are forced to underwrite increasingly risky deals. This strategy often backfires, as ignoring the elevated risk of failure leads to more blow-ups and poor fund performance.
While institutional capital market assumptions align with objective, yield-based models, their actual portfolio actions can deviate. Many institutions, despite models suggesting caution on expensive US stocks, maintained market weight, benefiting from the prolonged bull market. This highlights a critical inconsistency between their stated process and real-world behavior.
Many LPs focus solely on backing the 'best people.' However, a manager's chosen strategy and market (the 'neighborhood') is a more critical determinant of success. A brilliant manager playing a difficult game may underperform a good manager in a structurally advantaged area.
When a private equity firm sells a passive stake of itself (the GP) to a large investor, it's often a negative signal. This ownership change frequently triggers a shift towards asset gathering and strategy proliferation, diluting the focus that generated the initial "great funds."
Similar to professional sports, the asset management industry has become hyper-competitive. As the baseline skill level of all participants becomes exceptionally high, the difference between them narrows. This makes random chance, or luck, a larger determinant of who wins in any given deal or fund cycle, making repeatable alpha harder.
David Swenson's endowment model has two parts: diversified market exposure (beta) and manager outperformance (alpha). While wealth advisors can easily replicate the beta part using low-cost ETFs, they lack the institutional resources to consistently select top-quartile managers who generate true alpha.
The high-velocity investment model pioneered by Tiger Global didn't disappear. Instead, its core strategy—prioritizing capital velocity over returns—was adopted by 6-8 other major firms. The venture landscape has bifurcated, with many top-tier brands moving toward this model, leaving a void in the craft-focused, high-touch space.
While limited partners in venture funds often claim to seek differentiated strategies, in reality, they prefer minor deviations from established models. They want the comfort of the familiar with a slight "alpha" twist, making it difficult for managers with genuinely unconventional approaches to raise institutional capital.
