When a private equity firm sells a passive stake of itself (the GP) to a large investor, it's often a negative signal. This ownership change frequently triggers a shift towards asset gathering and strategy proliferation, diluting the focus that generated the initial "great funds."
During due diligence, the most revealing portfolio company reference checks involve asking CEOs leading questions. Frame inquiries to suggest the private equity sponsor is taking undue credit for successes. This tactic encourages frankness and uncovers the true dynamics of value creation and deal sourcing.
Capital has become commoditized with thousands of PE firms competing. The old model of buying low and selling high with minor tweaks no longer works. True value creation has shifted to hands-on operational improvements that drive long-term growth, a skill many investors lack.
There's a surprising disconnect between the perceived brilliance of individual investors at large, well-known private equity firms and their actual net-to-LP returns, which are often no better than the market median. This violates the assumption that top talent automatically generates outlier results.
The private equity market is following the hedge fund industry's maturation curve. Just as hedge funds saw a consolidation around large platforms and niche specialists, a "shakeout" is coming for undifferentiated, mid-market private equity firms that lack a unique edge or sufficient scale.
General Partners (GPs) have shifted from viewing secondary sales as an LP-driven nuisance to a strategic tool. They now facilitate liquidity for investors to maintain their reputation and use continuation vehicles to retain top-performing assets beyond a fund's original lifespan.
PE firms are struggling to sell assets acquired in 2020-21, causing distributions to plummet from 30% to 10% annually. This cash crunch prevents investors from re-upping into new funds, shrinking the pool of capital and further depressing the PE-to-PE exit market, trapping investor money.
When private equity firms begin marketing to retail investors, it's less about sharing wealth and more a sign of distress. This pivot often occurs when institutional backers demand returns and raising new capital becomes difficult, forcing firms to tap the public for liquidity.
When assessing a co-investment, LPs should request data on employee participation. Deals where the PE firm's own staff invest their personal capital tend to be the better-performing ones, serving as a powerful, internal signal of conviction that goes beyond the official pitch.
The era of generating returns through leverage and multiple expansion is over. Future success in PE will come from driving revenue growth, entering at lower multiples, and adding operational expertise, particularly in the fragmented middle market where these opportunities are more prevalent.
After discovering that buyers of their portfolio companies were achieving 3x returns, TA shifted its strategy. Instead of selling 100%, they now often sell partial stakes. This provides liquidity to LPs and de-risks the investment while allowing TA to capture significant upside from the company's continued compounding growth.