Capital has become commoditized with thousands of PE firms competing. The old model of buying low and selling high with minor tweaks no longer works. True value creation has shifted to hands-on operational improvements that drive long-term growth, a skill many investors lack.

Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.

The primary risk to a VC fund's performance isn't its absolute size but rather a dramatic increase (e.g., doubling) from one fund to the next. This forces firms to change their strategy and write larger checks than their conviction muscle is built for.

PE firms are struggling to sell assets acquired in 2020-21, causing distributions to plummet from 30% to 10% annually. This cash crunch prevents investors from re-upping into new funds, shrinking the pool of capital and further depressing the PE-to-PE exit market, trapping investor money.

The era of generating returns through leverage and multiple expansion is over. Future success in PE will come from driving revenue growth, entering at lower multiples, and adding operational expertise, particularly in the fragmented middle market where these opportunities are more prevalent.

Sequoia's internal philosophy dictates that venture capital is not a downside minimization game. A fund with a write-off rate below 40% is seen as not taking enough risk to generate outlier returns. This counter-intuitive metric prioritizes bold bets over preserving capital on every deal.

A common investor mistake is underwriting a deal that requires 15-20 different initiatives to go perfectly. A superior approach concentrates on 3-5 key value drivers, recognizing that the probability of many independent events all succeeding is mathematically negligible, thus providing a more realistic path to a strong return.

To generate returns on a $10B acquisition, a PE firm needs a $25B exit, which often means an IPO. They must underwrite this IPO at a discount to public comps, despite having paid a 30% premium to acquire the company, creating a significant initial value gap to overcome from day one.

PE deals, especially without a large fund, cannot tolerate zeros. This necessitates a rigorous focus on risk reduction and what could go wrong. This is the opposite of angel investing, where the strategy is to accept many failures in a portfolio to capture the massive upside of the 1-in-10 winner.