While institutional capital market assumptions align with objective, yield-based models, their actual portfolio actions can deviate. Many institutions, despite models suggesting caution on expensive US stocks, maintained market weight, benefiting from the prolonged bull market. This highlights a critical inconsistency between their stated process and real-world behavior.

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Antti Ilmanen contrasts two forecasting methods. Objective forecasts (e.g., using market yields) predict higher returns from low valuations. Subjective forecasts (from investor surveys) extrapolate recent performance, becoming most bullish precisely when objective measures signal the most caution, creating a dangerous conflict for investors.

Contrary to popular belief, the market may be getting less efficient. The dominance of indexing, quant funds, and multi-manager pods—all with short time horizons—creates dislocations. This leaves opportunities for long-term investors to buy valuable assets that are neglected because their path to value creation is uncertain.

Historically, US earnings outgrew the world by 1%. Post-GFC, this widened to 3%. Investors have extrapolated this recent, higher rate as the new normal, pushing the US CAPE ratio to nearly double that of non-US markets. This represents a historically extreme valuation based on a potentially temporary growth advantage.

A fundamental reason for differing investor behavior is the unit of discussion. Bond investors focus on forward-looking yields, which naturally fosters a contrarian, mean-reverting mindset. Equity investors focus on backward-looking prices and returns, leading them to extrapolate recent trends and chase momentum.

Contrary to popular belief, economists don't assume perfect rationality because they think people are flawless calculators. It's a simplifying assumption that makes models mathematically tractable. The goal is often to establish a theoretical benchmark, not to accurately describe psychological reality.

Moving from science to investing requires a critical mindset shift. Science seeks objective, repeatable truths, while investing involves making judgments about an unknowable future. Successful investors must use quantitative models as guides for judgment, not as sources of definitive answers.

Quoting G.K. Chesterton, Antti Ilmanen highlights that markets are "nearly reasonable, but not quite." This creates a trap for purely logical investors, as the market's perceived precision is obvious, but its underlying randomness is hidden. This underscores the need for deep humility when forecasting financial markets.

Analysts exhibit a predictable pattern: they issue overly optimistic long-term earnings forecasts to maintain good relationships with management, then gradually reduce them as the announcement nears. The final forecast is often slightly pessimistic, setting a low bar for companies to easily "beat," making the process a rigged game.

Financial models struggle to project sustained high growth rates (>30% YoY). Analysts naturally revert to the mean, causing them to undervalue companies that defy this and maintain high growth for years, creating an opportunity for investors who spot this persistence.

Shifting capital between asset classes based on relative value is powerful but operationally difficult. It demands a "coordination tax"—a significant organizational effort to ensure different teams price risk comparably and collaborate. This runs counter to the industry's typical siloed, product-focused structure.