Similar to professional sports, the asset management industry has become hyper-competitive. As the baseline skill level of all participants becomes exceptionally high, the difference between them narrows. This makes random chance, or luck, a larger determinant of who wins in any given deal or fund cycle, making repeatable alpha harder.

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Capital has become commoditized with thousands of PE firms competing. The old model of buying low and selling high with minor tweaks no longer works. True value creation has shifted to hands-on operational improvements that drive long-term growth, a skill many investors lack.

There's a surprising disconnect between the perceived brilliance of individual investors at large, well-known private equity firms and their actual net-to-LP returns, which are often no better than the market median. This violates the assumption that top talent automatically generates outlier results.

Underperforming VC firms persist because the 7-10+ year feedback loop for returns allows them to raise multiple funds before performance is clear. Additionally, most LPs struggle to distinguish between a manager's true investment skill and market-driven luck.

In a world of highly skilled money managers, absolute skill becomes table stakes and luck plays a larger role in outcomes. According to Michael Mauboussin's "paradox of skill," an allocator's job is to identify managers whose *relative* skill—a specific, durable edge—still dominates results.

Many LPs focus solely on backing the 'best people.' However, a manager's chosen strategy and market (the 'neighborhood') is a more critical determinant of success. A brilliant manager playing a difficult game may underperform a good manager in a structurally advantaged area.

The private equity market is following the hedge fund industry's maturation curve. Just as hedge funds saw a consolidation around large platforms and niche specialists, a "shakeout" is coming for undifferentiated, mid-market private equity firms that lack a unique edge or sufficient scale.

The era of generating returns through leverage and multiple expansion is over. Future success in PE will come from driving revenue growth, entering at lower multiples, and adding operational expertise, particularly in the fragmented middle market where these opportunities are more prevalent.

The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.

Relying on an established VC's past performance creates a false sense of security. The critical diligence question for any manager, emerging or established, is whether they are positioned to win *now*. Factors like increased fund size, team changes, and evolving market dynamics mean a great track record from 5-10 years ago has limited predictive power today.

In a world of high valuations and compressed returns, LPs can no longer be passive allocators. They must build capabilities for real-time portfolio management, actively buying and selling fund positions based on data-driven views of relative value and liquidity. This active management is a new source of LP alpha.