Quoting G.K. Chesterton, Antti Ilmanen highlights that markets are "nearly reasonable, but not quite." This creates a trap for purely logical investors, as the market's perceived precision is obvious, but its underlying randomness is hidden. This underscores the need for deep humility when forecasting financial markets.
Analysts exhibit a predictable pattern: they issue overly optimistic long-term earnings forecasts to maintain good relationships with management, then gradually reduce them as the announcement nears. The final forecast is often slightly pessimistic, setting a low bar for companies to easily "beat," making the process a rigged game.
Private equity's low reported correlation with public markets is largely an illusion created by smoothed, infrequent valuations ("volatility laundering"). The effect is exaggerated when institutions report private asset returns with a one-quarter lag, creating "accounting diversification" instead of real risk reduction.
Historically, US earnings outgrew the world by 1%. Post-GFC, this widened to 3%. Investors have extrapolated this recent, higher rate as the new normal, pushing the US CAPE ratio to nearly double that of non-US markets. This represents a historically extreme valuation based on a potentially temporary growth advantage.
A fundamental reason for differing investor behavior is the unit of discussion. Bond investors focus on forward-looking yields, which naturally fosters a contrarian, mean-reverting mindset. Equity investors focus on backward-looking prices and returns, leading them to extrapolate recent trends and chase momentum.
While institutional capital market assumptions align with objective, yield-based models, their actual portfolio actions can deviate. Many institutions, despite models suggesting caution on expensive US stocks, maintained market weight, benefiting from the prolonged bull market. This highlights a critical inconsistency between their stated process and real-world behavior.
Antti Ilmanen contrasts two forecasting methods. Objective forecasts (e.g., using market yields) predict higher returns from low valuations. Subjective forecasts (from investor surveys) extrapolate recent performance, becoming most bullish precisely when objective measures signal the most caution, creating a dangerous conflict for investors.
Contrary to popular belief, earnings growth has a very low correlation with decadal stock returns. The primary driver is the change in the valuation multiple (e.g., P/E ratio expansion or contraction). The correlation between 10-year real returns and 10-year valuation changes is a staggering 0.9, while it is tiny for earnings growth.