The Thucydides Trap, where a rising power challenges an established one, is often misinterpreted. Historian Graham Allison's data shows that in over half the historical cases, it's the challenging power, not the established one, that is ultimately destroyed in the conflict.
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The current era of multipolarity, global economic integration, and tensions between rising and incumbent powers (like China and the US) is more analogous to the early 20th century before WWI than the bipolar Cold War. This historical parallel carries stark warnings about the potential for conflict.
The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
The 1990s belief that economic liberalization would inevitably make China democratic provided ideological cover for policies that fueled its growth. This hubris, combined with corporate greed, allowed the US to facilitate the rise of its greatest geopolitical rival without achieving the expected political reforms.
Policymakers instinctively rely on historical analogies. While powerful, this reliance is dangerous when based on simplistic or false comparisons like 'another Munich' or 'another Vietnam.' This makes rigorous, nuanced historical perspective essential to avoid repeating past mistakes driven by flawed parallels.
Historically, rising and ruling powers don't stumble into war directly. Instead, their heightened distrust creates a tinderbox where a seemingly minor incident involving a third party (like the assassination in Sarajevo pre-WWI) can escalate uncontrollably into a catastrophic conflict.
Strategist Otto von Bismarck understood that after unifying Germany in 1871, it had reached its "culminating point of success." He knew any further expansion would trigger a hostile global coalition. His successors ignored this logic, pursued further greatness, and predictably created the very alliance that destroyed them.
The core driver of a 'Thucydides Trap' conflict is the psychological distress experienced by the ruling power. For the U.S., the challenge to its identity as '#1' creates a disorienting fear and paranoia, making it prone to miscalculation, independent of actual military or economic shifts.
Citing a historical pattern, the speaker notes that 12 out of the last 16 times a rising power (like China) has confronted a ruling power (like the US), the result has been war. This 'Thucydides Trap' suggests a high statistical probability of military conflict.
Ed Luttwak identifies a recurring historical pattern of self-sabotage. Imperial Germany challenged the British Royal Navy, which protected its global commerce. Today, China challenges the US Navy, which secures the sea lanes vital for Chinese trade. This is a recurring strategic error driven by a misplaced desire for military parity.
The recent uptick in global conflicts, from Ukraine to the Caribbean, is not a series of isolated events. It's a direct result of adversaries perceiving American weakness and acting on the historical principle that nations expand their influence until they are met with sufficient counter-force.
